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I. Introduction
In December, 2012, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) Executive
Committee approved a public hearing for proposed model
amendments to Article IV of the Multistate Tax Compact (Compact).
The Hearing Officer held a public hearing and received nine sets of
written comments. Numerous comments, many oral, were received
after the hearing. This report provides a background to the
amendments, a summary of the proposals’ substantive features, a
review of the public testimony, and the Hearing Officer’s comments
and recommendations, including in some cases, his proposals for a
redrafted statute.
II. Background
A. Procedural Background
In 1957, after decades of attempts by various organizations to draft
model state corporate income tax apportionment rules, the Uniform
Law Commission (ULC) succeeded in promulgating its model Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). UDITPA provides a
model law for assigning the total taxable income of a multistate
corporation among the states in which it does business. Article IV of the
Compact incorporates UDITPA nearly verbatim. Most, but not all,
enacted versions of the Compact also do.
A number of important provisions are significantly outdated. States
have begun to revise these provisions unilaterally. In response to these
developments, the MTC formally recommended to the ULC in
September of 2006 that it initiate a project to revise UDITPA. In

particular, the MTC recommended that the following five provisions be
the focus of review:
1. Sales factor numerator sourcing for services and intangibles
(market‐based sourcing) (Compact Art. IV.17)
2. Sales Definition (Compact Art. IV.1(g))
3. Factor Weighting (Compact Art. IV.9)
4. Business Income Definition (Compact Art. IV.1(a))
5. Equitable Apportionment (Compact Art. IV.18)
In August 2007, after receiving the MTC’s recommendations and
additional input from the Federation of Tax Administrators, the Council
on State Taxation, and others, the ULC determined that it would review
and “revise UDITPA in its entirety.” A UDITPA committee was formed
and two reporters were appointed,1 one of whom (Pomp) is the author
of this Hearing Report. The reporters held meetings to receive
additional public comment. At these meetings and in writing, the MTC
explained that a revised model would help maintain a reasonable level
of uniformity by giving state legislatures something to draw on as they
modernize their apportionment statutes. Some taxpayer
representatives and others opposed the effort. In June 2009, after
considerable public comment and controversy, the ULC discharged its
UDITPA committee and explained that no further work would be
undertaken, with the understanding that it might re‐open the effort at
a later time.
The MTC suspended its efforts at reforming UDITPA while the ULC
project was underway. This was reasonable because UDITPA is the
ULC’s model law. The MTC did not want to be seen as pre‐empting or
1

The other reporter was Prentiss Willson, Of Counsel to Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP.
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interfering with the ULC project. But as a result time was lost on issues
that were advancing rapidly, such as market‐based sourcing. In
retrospect, the aborted ULC project delayed the MTC’s efforts to take a
leadership role on fast‐developing issues as evidenced by California
having adopted a “benefits received” approach to market‐based
sourcing whereas the Uniformity Committee adopted a “delivery of
service” approach.
In July 2009, the MTC Executive Committee directed that “revisions to
Article IV of the compact—specifically, the five areas suggested as the
focus for the Uniform Law Commission’s revision project—be referred
to the Uniformity Committee and that [the Uniformity Committee]
come back to the Executive Committee if the Uniformity Committee
recommends the scope of issues be changed.” The Uniformity
Committee completed its work in March 2012, and in December 2012
the Executive Committee approved the proposed model for public
hearing.
B. Summary of the Uniformity Committee Proposals
The Uniformity Committee’s proposals would replace the terms
“business income” and “non‐business income” with “apportionable
income” and “non‐apportionable income.” Both categories would be
broadened, and more generally, business income would include all
income subject to apportionment under the Constitution.
The apportionment formula would be redefined in three ways: (1) the
factor weighting would be left to each state, although double‐weighted
sales is recommended, (2) the sales factor would be limited to receipts
from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s
3

trade or business, and (3) receipts from transactions other than sales of
tangible personal property would be sourced, like those from sales of
tangible personal property, to the market state.
More specifically, receipts from sales of services would be sourced to
the location where the service was delivered, receipts from sale or
lease of intangibles would generally be sourced to where the intangible
was used, and receipts from lease of tangible personal property and the
sale or lease of real property would be sourced to where the property
was located.
Finally, the alternative apportionment provisions would be clarified to
allow states to adopt regulations, in addition to the existing power to
make ad hoc adjustments.
C. Public Hearing2
The public hearing was held March 28, 2013, in Washington D.C.
following more than 30 days’ notice. The hearing was well attended,
both in‐person and by telephone, with approximately 35 people
identifying themselves. Oral comments were received regarding
amendments to each of the five provisions. In addition, nine sets of
written comments were received and are available on the MTC website
at http://www.mtc.gov/Uniformity.aspx?id=5777.
D. Nomenclature and Style
Throughout this Hearing Report, “Act” is used to refer to UDITPA.
References to the Act by state tax lawyers deviate from the citation
used by the Compact. For example, Act Art. IV.18, the provision on
2

All of the public comments were summarized herein by Lila D. Disque of the MTC.

4

alternative apportionment, is known to everyone in the field as
“Section 18.” The Hearing Officer follows this more common usage. The
other Articles discussed in this report tend to be known by their subject
matter, such as the “apportionment formula,” and the “sales factor,“
rather than by their more formal Compact citation.
“Draft” is used to refer to the proposed changes by the Uniformity
Committee. “Report” refers to a document prepared by Shirley Sicilian,
MTC General Counsel, to Cory Fong, Chair of the Executive Committee,
of May 10, 2012. Although the Hearing Officer quibbles with portions of
this Report, it is a remarkable document that is quoted at length at
various places below; the full document is worth careful study.
The Hearing Officer does not intend that this report read like a law
review article, or that it reinvent the wheel. We have a shared tax
culture and heritage, which means a statute like P.L. 86‐272 or a U.S.
Supreme Court case like Quill can be mentioned without any
elaboration or explanation. Most readers are also familiar with the
state tax literature. The intent is not to get mucked up in the weeds, or
rely on a particular state’s experience, statutes, or case law. To do so
only invites distraction and cavils. Consequently, there are only limited
citations and footnotes because descriptions of state law or cases are
meant to be only illustrative of different approaches. Nor is there any
reason to challenge or deconstruct Supreme Court opinions. All of that
can wait for a different forum. The goal of the Hearing Officer was to fly
at less than 30,000 feet but not crash land in the swamp. Any of the
discussion below can be expanded and elaborated upon in future
documents.

5

The Hearing Officer was given a broader mandate (actually no mandate
at all) than has been traditional for this role. He thanks Joe Huddleston,
Executive Director of the MTC, for this vote of confidence (and hopes
he does not regret it).
E. Organization of the Report
Many of the issues raised by the Draft are interdependent. For
example, under the Draft the sales factor includes only receipts from
transactions satisfying the transactional test, which is the subject of
other amendments. The Hearing Officer suggests a different definition
of the transactional test than does the Draft and that suggestion has
obvious implications for the sales factor. Consequently, a discussion of
the transactional test best precedes a discussion of the sales factor.
As another example of interdependency, the Draft excludes from the
sales factor the receipts from the treasury function and from hedging.
These same receipts are also thrown out under the Draft’s rule in Art.
IV.17 for receipts from the sale of intangibles. Because the Hearing
Officer argues that the treasury function and hedging are best dealt
with under Draft Art. IV.17 and not as part of the sales factor, the
former is addressed before the latter.
The Draft’s revisions of equitable apportionment provide a backdrop to
many of the other proposed amendments and for that reason is best
discussed early on. Similarly, whether a state has a single sales factor
apportionment formula rather than one incorporating property and
payroll is likely to influence the evaluation of a proposed amendment.
Hence there is value to discussing the Draft’s proposals for the
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apportionment formula before more specific amendments are
addressed.
Consequently, to provide a more manageable presentation, the Draft
amendments are discussed in the following order: factor weighting,
equitable apportionment, business income, market‐based sourcing, and
the receipts factor.
F. Acknowledgements
Following the Hearing, many of the luminaries in the field provided
invaluable support. The exchange of views and reactions continued to
nearly the date on this Hearing Report. Although time consuming, the
process was invaluable.
The state tax field may be the depository of the greatest intellectual
firepower in the tax profession. Generous with their time, able to put
on their tax policy hats, and willing to share a wealth of experiences
and observations, the following friends and colleagues happily helped
educate the Hearing Officer: Mary Benton, Dan Bucks, Bruce Ely, Peter
Faber, Michael Fatale, Craig Fields, Karl Friedan, Jeff Friedman, Cara
Griffith, Rick Handel, Helen Hecht, Ferdinand Hogroian, Holly Hyans,
Bruce Johnson, Rick Kay, Todd Lard, Doug Lindholm, Jane May, Ben
Miller, Mitch Newmark, Richard Parker, Art Rosen, Ted Spangler, Kirk
Stark, John Swain, Phil Tatarowicz, and Marilyn Wethekam.
Many of the views expressed below had their roots in discussions with
Prentiss Willson when he served with the Hearing Officer as a co‐
reporter for the ULC’s project on revising UDITPA. Prentiss is the
proverbial “lawyer’s scholar” and “scholar’s lawyer.” He bridges both
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camps effortlessly and is a font of wisdom, experience, and sound
judgment.
Lila Disque, Elliot Dubin, and Bruce Fort of the MTC’s staff performed
herculean assistance. Shirley Sicilian was a wonderful sounding board,
intellectual provocateur, and reality check. One of the fun things about
this project was getting to brainstorm with Shirley. Her charm and
grace, combined with analytical rigor, made her a delight to work with.
III. Public Comment and Recommendations
A. Factor Weighting
The Uniformity Committee recommended that the apportionment
formula be changed to a double‐weighted sales factor.
Art. IV.9 All business income shall be apportioned to this
State by multiplying the income by a fraction, the numerator
of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor plus
two times the sales factor, and the denominator of which is
threefour.
The Executive Committee changed the proposal as follows:
Art. IV.9 All business income shall be apportioned to this
State by multiplying the income by a fraction, [State should
define its factor weighting fraction here. Recommended
definition: “the numerator of which is the property factor
plus the payroll factor plus two times the sales factor, and
the denominator of which is threefour].
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1. Reasons for Change
Most states have moved away from the Act’s evenly‐weighted, three‐
factor formula, replacing it with approaches that more heavily weight
the sales factor. Today, only a small number of states unconditionally
follow the Act’s formula. Most either double weight the sales factor or
use it exclusively.
As the Report explains, the Uniformity Committee considered five
options: “(1) retain the current, three‐factor equal weighting, (2)
double weight the sales factor, (3) use only a single sales factor, (4)
indicate that the weighting is each state’s choice (this approach lacks a
uniformity focus, but would acknowledge states’ differing tax policies
and the point that states are, in fact, moving in a uniform direction),
and (5) allow taxpayers to elect a weighting which will allow it to file
uniformly in all or some threshold percentage of states (unlike the
taxpayer apportionment election that exists now in Compact Article
III.1, this election would be limited to factor weighting and would
require a consistent election in some number of other states) . . . [T]he
Uniformity Committee determined that the double‐weighted sales
formula had the most support among the states.” Report, p. 11.
The Uniformity Committee recommended a double‐weighted sales
factor; the Executive Committee voted to allow each state to “define its
[own] factor weighting fraction,” but recommended the double‐
weighted sales factor.
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2. Public Comment
Commenters viewed this proposed amendment as an imperfect
solution. Benjamin Miller, appearing on his own behalf, stated he
prioritizes uniformity, and if this goal is achieved the overall result may
be acceptable. Dan Bucks, who also appeared on his own behalf,
objected to any attempt to move states toward a common formula in
the current policy environment. Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP
advocated a “menu of options” for states to choose from as far as
factor‐weighting fractions.
3. Comments by the Hearing Officer
i. A Brief History of Formulary Apportionment
At the risk of elevating brevity over precision, a brief history of
apportionment follows:
Initially, separate accounting was used more frequently than formulary
apportionment. Besides its conceptual weaknesses, separate
accounting was expensive for taxpayers to implement because it was
not the way they normally kept their books and records.
Apportionment formulas started to replace separate accounting as the
preferred method. Cases like Underwood, Bass, and Hans Rees’ show
that some of the early formulas consisted of one factor: property.
Other states, including Massachusetts, used what came to be the
UDITPA evenly‐weighted, three‐factor formula utilizing property,
payroll, and sales. As these two approaches suggest, in the early part of
the 20th century apportionment formulas differed widely among the
states.
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The growth of interstate mercantile and manufacturing activities was
accompanied by calls for uniformity in state taxation. Well before the
adoption of UDITPA, the National Tax Association (NTA) proposed an
evenly‐weighted, three‐factor formula. The NTA did not claim that the
formula was based on any economic principle or theory, or that it was
better than other formulas at measuring where income was generated.
To the contrary, the NTA recognized that all formulas were arbitrary.
The most important thing was uniformity and that meant a formula on
which the states could agree. The property and payroll factors were
attractive to the manufacturing states (the origin states) and the sales
factor was attractive to the market or destination states. By
recommending the evenly‐weighted, three‐factor formula (the so‐
called Massachusetts formula), a formula that reflected what many
states were already doing, and one that was attractive to both the
origin and destination states, the NTA opted for political expediency
and ease of adoption.
The NTA recommended the destination principle for the sales factor. At
the time, destination was only one of the approaches used for assigning
sales. Two other approaches were origin based: the state from which
the goods were shipped, or the state in which the sales office was
located. If the purpose of the sales factor is to recognize the
contribution by the market state, a destination principle made more
sense than the origin‐based rules.
Despite the political attractiveness of the evenly‐weighted, three factor
formula, a Nobel Prize winning economist described the formula as:
“[t]his simple but arbitrary and capricious formula has all the earmarks
of having been concocted by a committee of lawyers who had
11

forgotten anything they ever were taught about statistics or
economics.” William Vickrey, The Corporate Income Tax in the U.S. Tax
System, 73 Tax Notes 597, 602 (1996). (Vickrey also thought a sales
factor had no role to play in an apportionment formula, a common
opinion among economists when UDITPA was being debated and one
shared by the Willis Committee, which recommended only property
and payroll factors.) This criticism ignored a major virtue of the
formula: it divides something that cannot be easily assigned
geographically–income–using factors that can be located
geographically–property, payroll, and sales. But as the discussion of Art.
IV.17 suggests, see Sections III.D(5)‐(10) below, the sales factor might
be less able to deal with the receipts from services and intangibles than
the receipts from tangible property.
Because of the lack of any scientific or economic model upon which the
evenly‐weighted, three‐factors were based, the formula could not resist
attempts by states, at the urging of business, to use it to encourage
economic development. Around the 1970’s, a few states started to
double weight the sales factor with many more doing so over the next
few decades.
Compared with an evenly‐weighted three‐factor formula, a double‐
weighted sales factor results in increased tax on some corporations and
decreased tax on others, and has no effect on corporations that
conduct all of their activities in the state. The effect depends on the
mathematical relationship between the sales factor and the property
and payroll factors. More specifically, corporations whose sales factors
are less than the average of their property and payroll factors benefit
from a double‐weighted sales factor; other interstate corporations are
12

disadvantaged. The former describes, for example, corporations with
the bulk of their manufacturing and payroll in a state that sell outside
that state.
Double weighting (or using only a sales factor) results in increased tax
on corporations that manufacture outside the state and sell in the state
without the protection of P.L. 86‐272. But for an out‐of‐state
corporation protected by P.L. 86‐272, a double‐weighted sales factor
will be more of a disincentive for the corporation to engage in nexus‐
creating activities in that state than would an evenly‐weighted factor.
The disincentive effects are even greater under a single‐factor sales
formula.
Legislators typically view the shift from an evenly‐weighted to a double‐
weighted sales factor (or sales only) as an incentive for in‐state
corporations to expand their operations in the state and for out‐of‐
state corporations to locate in the state. States have emphasized the
incentive effects of the shift over the disincentive effects.
A state that finds double weighting attractive will be drawn to using
only a sales factor. Mathematically, this is equivalent to placing an
infinite weight on the sales factor in any formula using a property or
payroll factor. A single sales factor provides the greatest benefit to
corporations that are primarily producing inside the taxing state and
selling outside that state, and provides the greatest detriment to those
primarily producing outside the state and selling in the state. Many
commentators challenge the benefits of using a single sales factor (or
double‐weighted sales factor) to influence economic development.
Even if there are benefits, they will be neutralized as other states adopt
similar measures.
13

From a tax policy perspective, the single sales factor is virtually
indefensible. It is hard to think of situations where an interstate
taxpayer generates income without the use of capital or labor.
Moreover, under the right fact pattern, a single sales factor might
produce results that violate the external consistency prong of the fair
apportionment requirement under the Commerce Clause, results
raising the possibility of alternative apportionment. In addition, using
only sales to apportion income places a great burden on the rules used
for assigning receipts to a state. As the discussion of Art. IV.17 suggests,
see Section III.D, below, the Hearing Officer is concerned whether the
various existing state rules or those proposed in the Draft can
meaningfully bear that burden (at least for interstate business‐to‐
business transactions).
Politically, corporations prefer a tax reduction implemented by changes
to the apportionment formula, as opposed to a visible reduction in the
tax rate or an increase in grants or credits. Compared to these other
ways of benefitting corporate investment and activities, a change in the
apportionment formula is more opaque and non‐transparent, and more
likely to escape notice and debate.
ii. Double Weighting As a Fair Compromise
There is no science, economic theory, or model that determines the
normative weighting of the factors, or for that matter, what the factors
should even be. At the least, a double‐weighted sales factor has the
advantage of sharing the tax base equally between the origin (or
production states) and the destination (or market states), assuming
sales are assigned to the latter. There are no strong normative reasons
for favoring the origin states over the destination states or vice versa so
14

that double‐weighting is a reasonable and fair compromise. If the
payroll and property factors are viewed as double‐weighting the origin
states, that is balanced by double‐weighting the sales factor.
The states did not adopt a double‐weighted sales factor, however,
because they thought it was a fair compromise. The overriding reason
was economic development—the same reason motivating the
movement to a single sales factor.
iii. The Recommendation of Double Weighting is Unlikely to
Have any Significant Effect
The Executive Committee’s proposal to allow states to define the factor
weighting fraction is a concession to reality. The states have long
deviated from the Act’s three‐factor, evenly‐weighted formula. The
proposal merely reflects the current state of affairs.
The recommendation of double weighting is unlikely to have much
effect. A substantial number of states currently double weight; the only
effect of the recommendation will be if it discourages some of them
from moving in the direction of a single sales factor. States that have
already made that change are hardly going to abandon it because of
the Draft, unless they are unhappy with a single sales factor for other
reasons, perhaps because a loss in tax revenue is not offset by
increased economic activity. The group that might be affected will be
the small number of states currently conforming to the Act. The Draft
will release them from the obligation of using a three‐factor, evenly‐
weighted formula, although some of these states may move directly to
using only sales and skip double weighting entirely.
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The Act’s evenly‐weighted, three‐factor formula did little to stop the
movement to double weighting or to the single sales factor. Double
weighting may be sound tax policy, but considerations of economic
development will typically prevail.
iv. The Effect on Uniformity
The recommendation that states can do what they want with the
formula will probably be criticized by some as a major setback for
uniformity. When the Hearing Officer was a co‐reporter for the ULC
project, he was often told that if no agreement could be reached on the
formula, there was no reason to continue with the project.
The Hearing Officer dismisses this view. Even back in 1957, when
UDITPA was proposed, uniformity never quite existed. Long before the
evenly‐weighted, three‐factor formula emerged as the consensus
approach, specialized formulas were used for specialized industries—
and these were often quite different from the three‐factor formula.
(The Hearing Officer has not attempted to determine whether the
states used similar industry‐specific formulas; some similarity no doubt
existed.) These specialized formulas co‐exist today with the Act’s
formula. The MTC, which has labored mightily to develop industry‐
specific formulas, has not been criticized (nor should it have been) on
the grounds that these efforts have thwarted uniformity. To the
contrary, one of the reasons the corporate income tax has proven to be
so resilient in light of the considerable structural changes in the
economy has been the development of these alternative formulas.
In 1957, the Act’s evenly‐weighted, three‐factor formula applied
primarily to manufacturing and mercantile activities, which at that time
16

represented a significant percentage of the country’s gross domestic
product (GDP). With the rise of interstate activities subject to
specialized formulas, which do not incorporate an evenly‐weighted,
three‐factor formula, such as those covering financial services,
telecommunications, broadcasting, and advertising, combined with the
country’s loss in manufacturing, the Act’s apportionment formula has
come to cover less of the country’s GDP. This suggests that the
movement away from the 1957 formula was less a threat to uniformity
than is sometimes asserted. Furthermore, given the specialized
formulas that always existed, the uniformity in the apportionment
formulas that prevailed in 1957 is probably overstated. Finally, the MTC
industry‐specific regulations that do not adopt the evenly‐weighted,
three‐factor formula cover major sectors of the service economy. The
Act’s formula has simply come to cover a less significant percentage of
GDP.
More fundamentally, perhaps uniformity should be viewed on an
industry basis, rather than on a more general level. The lack of criticism
of the MTC industry regulations as undercutting uniformity may be an
implicit endorsement of this view. If so, the MTC’s regulations covering
the apportionment of specialized industries such as financial
institutions, telecommunications, airlines, railroads, trucking
companies, and television and radio broadcasting have done more to
promote uniformity than the movement away from the three‐factor
formula has done to undercut uniformity.
Even these detailed industry‐specific regulations cannot respond to
what some might argue the concept of uniformity requires: identical
tax rules on taxable income and nexus; identical interpretation of terms
17

and concepts; and identical rates. To take those goals seriously,
however, would paralyze legitimate efforts at harmonizing the rules on
apportionment.
v. Concluding Observation
The Hearing Officer endorses the Executive Committee’s Proposal.
Notwithstanding the recommendation for double weighting, the march
to a single sales factor can still be expected to continue. The Hearing
Officer believes that the most useful role for the MTC is to continue its
cooperative efforts with the private sector to formulate industry‐
specific rules of apportionment. The MTC has a track record in being
able to bring interested parties together in a spirit of cooperation and
formulating workable model regulations.
B. Equitable Apportionment
The Uniformity Committee recommends adding a new paragraph to the
existing language in Article IV.18.
Article IV.18.
(a) If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this
Article do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's
business activity in this State, the taxpayer may petition
for or the tax administrator may require, in respect to all
or any part of the taxpayer's business activity, if
reasonable:
(1) separate accounting;
(2) the exclusion of any one or more of the factors;
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(3) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which
will fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in
this State; or
(4) the employment of any other method to effectuate
an equitable allocation and apportionment of the
taxpayer's income.
(b)
(1) If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this
Article do not fairly represent the extent of business
activity in this State of taxpayers engaged in a particular
industry or in a particular transaction or activity, the tax
administrator may, in addition to the authority provided in
section (a), establish appropriate rules or regulations for
determining alternative allocation and apportionment
methods for such taxpayers.
(2) A regulation adopted pursuant to this section shall be
applied uniformly, except that with respect to any taxpayer to
whom such regulation applies, the taxpayer may petition for,
or the tax administrator may require, adjustment pursuant to
Section 18(a).
1. Reasons for Change
Art. IV.18, commonly known as “Section 18,” or alternative or equitable
apportionment, recognizes that one size does not fit all. That is, the
apportionment provisions (and less commonly, the allocation
provisions) cannot work well in every possible situation. Section 18 acts
as a safety valve, allowing tax administrators and taxpayers to smooth
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the rough edges of the apportionment and allocation provisions when
applied to a particular transaction.
Some doubt exists whether the existing language of Article IV.18
authorizes the promulgation of regulations–hence the proposed new
paragraph. The Act’s references to the taxpayer’s business, using the
singular, rather than the plural–taxpayers’ businesses–and the
reference to the taxpayer’s activity rather than taxpayers’ activities,
raise the possibility that Section 18 does not authorize industry‐wide
regulations. Despite this doubt, many states have nonetheless issued
regulations under Section 18. Many times these regulations were
formulated in cooperation with the affected industries, which have no
reason to challenge them as unauthorized by the Act.
Neither the Proceedings of the Uniform Commissioners nor the official
Comment accompanying Section 18 address whether its language was
intended to authorize the promulgation of regulations. The single
Comment states: “Section 18 is intended as a broad authority, within
the principle of apportioning business income fairly among the states
which have contact with the income, to the tax administrator to vary
the apportionment formula and to vary the system of allocation where
the provisions of the Act do not fairly represent the extent of the
taxpayer’s business activity in the state,” which does not explicitly refer
to regulations. Commentary by participants in the drafting of UDITPA,
however, suggests that regulations were anticipated. Certainly the
states, with the support of the MTC, have long relied on Section 18 as
their basis to issue industry‐specific regulations. Indeed, part of MTC
Reg. IV.18(a) provides that “[i]n the case of certain industries such as air
transportation, rail transportation, ship transportation, trucking,
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television, radio, motion pictures, various types of professional
athletics, and so forth, the foregoing regulations in respect to the
apportionment formula may not set forth appropriate procedures for
determining the apportionment factors. Nothing in Article IV.18 or in
this Regulation IV.18 shall preclude [the tax administrator] from
establishing appropriate procedures under Article IV.10 to 17 for
determining the apportionment factors for each such industry, but such
procedures shall be applied uniformly.” (The Regulation does not
address the use of separate accounting.)
The Report states that the MTC has interpreted Section 18 as its
authority to adopt model special apportionment rules. Report, p. 25.
But these rules are hortatory and have no binding effect so that the
MTC needs no authorization for their adoption. In any event, Art. VI.3
of the Compact provides the MTC with the power to “recommend
proposals for an increase in uniformity or compatibility of State and
local tax laws with a view toward encouraging the simplification and
improvement of State and local tax law and administration.” If the MTC
needs any authority to issue non‐binding regulations, this provision
should provide it.
The purpose of the Draft is to conform the statute with the
longstanding position of the MTC and of tax administrators by granting
the power to establish rules or regulations, provided they are applied
uniformly. The Draft preserves the right of taxpayers to request, or tax
administrators to apply, alternative apportionment independent of any
regulations.
A second part of the current MTC Regulation cited above addresses
more limited applications of Section 18. That part provides that “Article
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IV.18. permits a departure from the allocation and apportionment
provisions of Article IV only in limited and specific cases where the
apportionment and allocation provisions contained in Article IV
produce incongruous results . . .” Prior to 2010, this part of the
regulation provided that “Article IV.18 permits a departure from the
allocation and apportionment provisions of Article IV only in limited
and specific cases. Article IV.18. may be invoked only in specific cases
where unusual fact situations (which ordinarily will be unique and non‐
recurring) produce incongruous results under the apportionment and
allocation provisions contained in Article IV.” Former MTC Reg. IV.18(a).
The Hearing Officer understands that the language “unusual fact
situations (which ordinarily will be unique and non‐recurring)” was
removed in 2010 to facilitate responses to the so‐called treasury
function cases that were being litigated across the country. See Hearing
Officer’s Report: Recommendation Concerning Proposed Amendment
to Multistate Tax Commission’s Model Allocation and Apportionment
Regulation IV.18.(a): Equitable Adjustment of Standard Allocation and
Apportionment Rule, dated March 29, 2010, available at
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Com
mittees/Executive_Committee/Scheduled_Events/Section18hearingoffi
cerrepfinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). The change was intended to
avoid the argument that Section 18 should be applied only in the case
of unusual, unique and nonrecurring situations, which would not
describe the commonplace treasury function. The change also
eliminates the argument that “nonrecurring” means occurring “only
once” in the life of the taxpayer.
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The Draft, by authorizing regulations, also puts to rest what some had
viewed as a tension between the two parts of MTC Reg. IV.18(a)(both
the former and current versions). This view suggested that the
admonition that Section 18 should be used sparingly was inconsistent
with the promulgation of industry‐wide regulations. Moreover, efforts
at uniformity would be undermined if alternative apportionment
moved away from being seen as a narrow exception to the more
general provisions in the Act.
Whether alternative apportionment should address only limited
situations rather than industry‐wide transactions reveals a deeper
conflict between the appropriate roles of the legislative and executive
branches. Under Section 18, an executive branch employee—a tax
administrator—is given the power to deviate from (and thus
functionally replace) the detailed and specific apportionment and
allocation rules promulgated by the legislative branch in order to
implement the legislative goal of more “fairly represent[ing] the extent
of the taxpayer’s business activity in this State.” This is a broad
delegation of power to the executive branch, which when exercised at
the initiative of a tax administrator, can undercut the reliance interests
of taxpayers that filed returns based on the Act. Even when a taxpayer
is granted the right to use equitable apportionment at its request, the
even‐handed treatment of any similarly situated taxpayers can be
jeopardized. These considerations suggest a narrow application of
alternative apportionment. (These considerations also suggest that any
regulations issued under Section 18 should be prospective only.)
The power to deal with narrow situations and the power to issue
regulations represent two very different conceptions of the relationship
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between the legislative and executive branches. The Draft would grant
executive branch employees the power to promulgate industry‐wide
regulations, granting a tax administrator discretion to set aside the
statutory apportionment and allocation rules and substitute an
alternative of broad application, not specifically endorsed by the
legislature (although one the legislature could overrule if it disagreed
with the tax department).
In other areas of non‐tax law, it is common to set forth legislative goals
in very broad terms, such as “just and reasonable rates,” or “public
convenience and necessity,” with a broad delegation to an executive
agency to implement those goals. Typically, the actions of the agency
implementing these broad goals are public, transparent, and highly
visible, which would likely be true of regulations under Section 18. By
contrast, ad hoc actions under alternative apportionment are typically
confidential.
2. Public Comment
Mr. Miller, Peter L. Faber, and Sutherland all noted in their comments
that Art. IV.18 should make explicit which party carries the burden of
showing the need for variation. Sutherland suggested the MTC look at
options to limit the application of Section 18 to be consistent with its
intent. It also suggested clarifying that the section applies only to
alternative apportionment and not alternative tax base calculation.
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3. Comments by the Hearing Officer
i. Regulation versus Statute
As a policy matter, the granting of power to tax administrators to adopt
alternative apportionment through regulations might be opposed on
the grounds that Section 18 should be used sparingly and that the
adoption of regulations is far removed from the provision’s roots.
Regulations that a tax department might adopt should be adopted by a
legislature.
The Hearing Officer appreciates this view but also acknowledges the
widespread existing reliance by tax administrators on Section 18 as the
authority for the promulgation of regulations; that reliance is unlikely
to be reversed. Also, there is some support for the view that Section 18
was meant to authorize such regulations. The Hearing Officer believes
that industry‐wide guidance is desirable—the issue is whether that goal
is best achieved through regulations or by statutes and that choice
cannot be resolved in the abstract.
Whether the legislature should adopt a statute or the tax department
should adopt a regulation is difficult to decide as an a priori matter. In
any given state, the allocation of responsibilities for tax drafting
probably reflects well‐entrenched political traditions. But contrary to
one asserted advantage, the legislative process does not necessarily
guarantee taxpayers more procedural protections than does the
regulatory process. Most (if not all) states have administrative
procedures acts that are consistent with the federal Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) or the Model State Administrative Procedures
Act. These procedures allow taxpayers to participate in various
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capacities throughout the regulatory process. The protections under
these Acts might equal or exceed whatever rights a taxpayer has to
participate in the legislative process. Ultimately, however, taxpayers
unhappy with regulations can always appeal to a legislature to overturn
them. In that sense, the legislature is the final arbiter.
While the Hearing Officer endorses the Draft’s delegation of regulatory
authority to tax administrators, the preference of the Hearing Officer is
to have the MTC continue its leadership role in promulgating industry‐
wide regulations. The MTC already has a successful record at dealing
with the financial institutions, telecommunications, airlines, railroads,
trucking companies, and television and radio broadcasting. The MTC
with its sophisticated expertise, depth of experience, and transparent
procedures should continue its efforts at drafting industry‐specific
regulations. Whether an MTC regulation is adopted in whole or in part
by a tax department or a legislature, the quality of decision making at
the state level is dramatically enhanced by the efforts of the MTC in
conjunction with the private sector. The MTC can marshal resources at
the national level that would be beyond the capabilities of most states.
Finally, nothing in the Draft or the discussion above would affect a tax
department’s normal procedures of issuing non‐binding guidance on
how it will treat certain transactions or industries. A department should
be free to explore various preliminary approaches as it gathers
experience and sharpens its understanding of taxpayers and their
business practices, and to provide early guidance to the public. Rather,
the issue is whether once a tax department has enough knowledge
about a particular problem area to apply its position uniformly to that
industry or transaction, it can take the next step and issue binding
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regulations rather than asking the legislature to intervene. On balance,
the Hearing Officer finds no compelling reason why a department
should be deprived of the power to issue regulations. If the custom and
tradition of a state favors statutory rather than regulatory intervention,
a tax department can always invite the legislature to become involved.
ii. The Burden of Proof Should be on the Party Invoking
Alternative Apportionment
One written comment submitted at the Hearing made several
suggestions, including a recommendation that the Draft should address
which party—the taxpayer or the tax administrator—has the burden of
proof when invoking equitable apportionment.
The Hearing Officer concludes that the broad consensus among the
states is that whichever party is seeking alternative apportionment has
the burden of proof. It seems obvious to many courts that the burden
should be placed on the party invoking alternative apportionment
because that party is asking permission to deviate from the general
rules on apportionment and allocation. On the other hand, there is a
presumption of correctness that accompanies a department’s
assessment. If that applies in the context of alternative apportionment
the taxpayer would always have the burden of proof.
The Hearing Officer concludes that the view that the party invoking
alternative apportionment has the burden of proof reflects general
principles of American jurisprudence, although these are rarely
articulated in the cases dealing with Section 18. These principles are
suggestive rather than determinative and in isolation none is definitive.
Taken as a whole, however, and applied in the context of Section 18,
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they support the consensus view that the party invoking alternative
apportionment should have the burden of proof.
First, the party that pleads a fact generally has the burden of proof.
That would be whichever party–the tax department or the taxpayer–
invoked alternative apportionment.
Second, the burden of proof commonly falls on the party that seeks to
change the existing, general state of affairs. In the case of Section 18,
the existing, general state of affairs is represented by the Act’s general
apportionment and allocation rules. Those represent the legislative
norm. The party seeking to deviate from the norm is the party invoking
alternative apportionment. Put differently, the person who claims the
benefit of an exception to a general rule typically has the burden of
proof.
Third, the general jurisprudential principle of handicapping or
discouraging a disfavored contention would place the burden of proof
on the party seeking alternative apportionment. Section 18 is meant to
apply sparingly (other than industry‐wide regulations). Those ad hoc
situations should be kept to a minimum. Consequently, the party
seeking alternative apportionment should have the burden of proof.
Fourth, the party with access to particular facts should have the burden
of proof. If, for example, a tax department has access to particular facts
that justify its invocation of alternative apportionment, such as metrics
gleaned from others in the industry that filed returns, it ought to have
the burden of proof.
Finally, the burden of proof is usually placed on the party that contends
the more unusual event has occurred. As applied in the context of
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Section 18, that would be the party seeking a narrow deviation from
the more general and specific rules on apportionment and allocation.
For a further discussion of the above principles, see McCormick on
Evidence, Sec. 337, (5th ed. 1999); Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction, Sec. 47:11 (7th ed. 2007).
The Hearing Officer recommends to the Executive Committee that
Section 18 contain an explicit provision stating that the party invoking
alternative apportionment should have the burden of proving that the
statutory conditions are satisfied, and that the burden should be the
same for either the taxpayer or the tax administrator. The state’s
normal rules on the applicable level or standard of proof would apply.
The Hearing Officer recognizes that the burden of proof can be
described as a procedural issue and not an apportionment or allocation
issue. Procedural issues have traditionally been viewed as outside the
scope of the Act. But uniform procedural issues can encourage uniform
outcomes and thus further the goals of the Act.
iii. No Penalties for Following the Act
The written comments presented at the Hearing also suggested that
Section 18 should prohibit the imposition of penalties if a taxpayer files
a return consistent with the Act, but the tax administrator successfully
invokes alternative apportionment. The Hearing Officer agrees (and in
the interest of disclosure, was involved in a case raising this issue).
Normally, a taxpayer cannot be expected to anticipate that a tax
administrator will successfully displace the statutory provisions on
apportionment with an alternative method. A taxpayer that has
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followed the apportionment and allocation provisions in the Act should
not be punished unless that reliance is unreasonable.
From a tax policy perspective, penalties are useful for punishing and
discouraging willful and purposeful conduct, which in turn should
encourage voluntary compliance. A taxpayer filing a return that is
consistent with a statute (and its interpretation) is not acting in any
manner that should be punished. Imposing a penalty under those
circumstances is equivalent to penalizing a driver for exceeding a speed
limit known only to the police.
This approach is not intended to prevent a tax department from
imposing penalties in tax avoidance situations. A tax department can
continue to argue a transaction is a sham, lacks economic substance,
does not reflect arm’s length pricing, violates the step transaction
doctrine, and the like. A state may also have adopted special penalty
statutes dealing with tax avoidance. The Hearing Officer does not
intend that violations of these statutes or anti‐abuse doctrines would
be precluded. Such situations and the concomitant penalties are
outside the Act. The Hearing Officer is concerned with non‐abusive
situations where a tax department might impose a method that a
taxpayer could not have reasonably expected, or perhaps was even
unavailable to the taxpayer as a filing method. The Hearing Officer finds
the imposition of penalties in this situation to be unreasonable.
The Hearing Officer’s draft below incorporates the view that penalties
are not appropriate when a taxpayer reasonably follows the statute,
although he realizes that some will object on the grounds that this is a
procedural matter that should be left to a state’s existing rules on
penalties. But the Hearing Officer regards the ancillary procedural rules
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implementing Section 18 as furthering uniformity in that taxpayers
should not be punished in some states for behavior that is not
punishable in other states.
iv. No Retroactive Revocation of Alternative Apportionment
One comment suggested that if a taxpayer successfully petitions for,
and receives, Section 18 alternative apportionment, that permission
should not be revoked retroactively. In other words, the tax
administrator should not be able to reject a return already filed using
the agreed‐upon alternative. The Hearing Officer agrees provided that
the taxpayer’s petition for alternative apportionment did not misstate
or misrepresent any material facts. The Hearing Officer would go even
further and protect any transaction that has already occurred
regardless of whether a return has yet been filed. The reliance interests
that deserve protection are those accompanying the transaction, not
the filing of a return.
v. Regulations under Section 18 Should be Consistent with
the Legislature’s Intent
The Draft grants broad discretion to a tax administrator under Section
18 to draft regulations. Those regulations will replace the specific
apportionment and allocation provisions of the Act, as adopted by a
legislature. Situations could arise where the regulations (or indeed
alternative apportionment imposed on an ad hoc basis) are inconsistent
with the intent of the legislature.
Consider, for example, the following illustration. Suppose a legislature
rejected a bill that would have adopted an alternative method for
apportioning the income of Industry X. Should a tax administrator be
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free to adopt that same method through a regulation (or on an ad hoc
basis) under Section 18 that is applicable to Industry X (or to a firm in
that industry)?
The problem is that discerning legislative intent is not always
straightforward. Not all tax proposals are presented to a legislature for
a final “up or down” vote. There can be hearings on bills that are never
voted out of committee. Others will never even be set down for a
hearing. Some proposed legislation will die for lack of a sufficient
number of sponsors. Others will be traded for something of more
interest to an industry. Not all of these situations are tantamount to the
full legislature having rejected a particular proposal. And even where
there is a straight “up‐or‐down” vote, a proposal might be rejected for
reasons having nothing to do with the merits.
A tax administrator can be expected not to waste administrative
resources adopting a regulation that a legislature is likely to overrule by
statute. In the end, this problem of discerning legislative intent is best
left to the judgment of tax administrators. (The same problem can arise
today under the existing Act when a tax administrator invokes
alternative apportionment on an ad hoc basis.)
vi. When Should a Department’s Position on Alternative
Apportionment be Published as a Regulation or Rule (or
Equivalent)?
On the one hand, if alternative apportionment were limited to unique,
non‐recurring, isolated situations, few would argue that a tax
department should publish that result in a regulation—there would be
no value in doing so because few, if any, other taxpayers would care.
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On the other hand, a position on alternative apportionment that has
broad application to an entire industry and was intended to be applied
generally and uniformly to that industry should be published as a
regulation. (Indeed, a state’s administrative procedures act might
require that a regulation be issued under these circumstances.) These
are two bookends between which a wide variety of situations can arise.
Some contend that an ad hoc application of alternative apportionment
is improper when the problem being addressed is widespread.
Situations are becoming common, involving advertising, financial
services, and broadcasting where a department is using alternative
apportionment to contravene the interaction of various elements in a
state’s tax regime. For example, consider the logical consequences of a
state’s adoption of a single‐sales factor with a cost of performance
(COP) rule, (or a rule that uses the percentage of days spent in the
taxing state) for assigning receipts from services. An out‐of‐state
service provider with numerous in‐state customers may never spend
any time in the state and accordingly assign no sales to that state under
COP (or under the percentage of days spent) methods. Consequently,
the taxpayer would apportion no income to the state.
This result is entirely predictable. It is hardly an isolated, limited, or
non‐recurring situation. The taxpayer is representative of a common
pattern. There is nothing unique about the taxpayer’s facts. Some
might conclude that under these facts alternative apportionment is
inappropriate. Nonetheless, if a tax department objects to a taxpayer
apportioning no income to the state and invokes alternative
apportionment and applies some version of market‐based sourcing,
that approach should be adopted in the form of a regulation because of
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the broad application to all out‐of‐state service providers. (In the
interests of disclosure, the Hearing Officer was involved in a case raising
this issue.)
A regulation serves the goals of transparency, notice, and even‐handed
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. In addition, the procedures
governing the promulgation of a regulation will in the normal course of
events bring the situation to the attention of the legislature, providing
it with the opportunity to evaluate whether the interaction of its
statutes was intentional or inadvertent. A taxpayer could, of course,
also contact the legislature but may not wish to do so out of fear of
offending—or undercutting—its working relationship with the
department.
The Draft implicitly and only weakly serves the goals of transparency,
notice, and even‐handed treatment of similarly situated taxpayers by
allowing, but not requiring, the tax administrator to establish
appropriate rules or regulations if the alternative apportionment
affects all taxpayers engaged in a particular industry or in a particular
activity. The Hearing Officer believes that the goals of the democratic
process and sound principles of tax administration are best served if
alternative apportionment of general and widespread applicability is
required to be established as a rule or regulation, which must be
applied uniformly.
Without this safeguard, Section 18 becomes a way for a tax department
to undercut a tax regime that might reflect a legislature’s value
judgments and that was the result of a process that benefited from
public input and comments. A function of a legislature is to balance
competing interests of taxpayers and the government. The non‐public
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use of alternative apportionment is tolerable when unique, non‐
recurring, or special circumstances are involved. Non‐disclosure,
however, is inappropriate when alternative apportionment has
widespread and broad applicability.
vii. Obsolete References to Illustrations of Alternative
Methods
Art. IV.18(a)(1) contains three examples of acceptable alternative
methods under Section 18: separate accounting; the exclusion of one or
more of the factors; or the inclusion of one or more additional factors
which will fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in this State.
A residual rule provides for the employment of any other method to
effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's
income. Presumably, the three examples are subsumed by the residual
rule.
In 1957 when the Act was adopted, the three examples might have
been useful because of the limited experience by the states with
concepts like equitable apportionment. Unlike Art. IV.1 where the
Draft’s incorporation of the existing definitions of business income is
valuable because of the long history of judicial interpretation, see
Section III.C(1), here the three illustrations have had much less impact,
especially in light of the residual rule. While there is no harm in
retaining them, in the interest of a cleaner and more modern draft they
can be eliminated without any loss in clarity or interpretation, relying
on the residual rule to provide for a broad range of possible
alternatives.
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4. Proposed Draft by the Hearing Officer
The Hearing Officer’s comments above are incorporated in his
proposed statute as follows:
18. (a) If the allocation or apportionment provisions of this Act do not
fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this
state, the taxpayer may petition for, or the [tax administrator] may
require, in respect to all or any part of the taxpayer's business activity,
any reasonable method to effectuate an equitable allocation and
apportionment of the taxpayer's income.
(b)(1) If the allocation or apportionment provisions of this Article do not
fairly represent the extent of business activity in this State of taxpayers
that are engaged in, or representative of, a particular industry, or that
engage in a particular transaction or activity of general applicability,
then a [tax administrator] that requires a reasonable method to
effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of income that it
applies uniformly to such industry, or to such transactions or activities,
shall publish that method in appropriate rules or regulations.
(b)(2) Rules or regulations adopted pursuant to this Section shall be
applied uniformly, except that with respect to any taxpayer to whom
such regulation applies, the taxpayer may petition for, or the [tax
administrator] may require, adjustment pursuant to Section 18(a).
(c) The party petitioning for, or the [tax administrator] requiring, the
use of any method to effectuate an equitable allocation and
apportionment of the taxpayer's income pursuant to (a), must prove by
[Drafter’s note: insert standard of proof here]: (1) that the allocation or
apportionment provisions of this Article do not fairly represent the
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extent of the taxpayer's activity in this State; and (2) that the
alternative to such provisions is reasonable. The same burden of proof
shall apply whether the taxpayer is petitioning for, or the [tax
administrator] is requiring, the use of any reasonable method to
effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's
income.
(d) If the [tax administrator] requires any method to effectuate an
equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's income, he or
she cannot impose any civil or criminal penalties solely because the
taxpayer reasonably relied on the allocation and apportionment
provisions of this Article in filing a return.
(e) A taxpayer that has been permitted by the [tax administrator] to use
a reasonable method to effectuate an equitable allocation and
apportionment of the taxpayer's income shall not have that permission
revoked with respect to transactions and activities that have already
occurred unless there has been a material change in, or a material
misrepresentation of, the facts provided by the taxpayer upon which
the [tax administrator] reasonably relied.
C. Business Income
The Uniformity Committee recommended the following amendments:
Art. IV.1(a) “BusinessApportionable income” means:
(i) all income that is apportionable under the Constitution
of the United States and is not allocated under the
laws of this state, including:
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(A) income arising from transactions and activity in
the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or
business, and includes
(B) income arising from tangible and intangible
property if the acquisition, management,
employment, development, and or disposition of
the property constitute integral parts of is or was
related to the operation of the taxpayer's regular
trade or business operations; and
(ii) any income that would be allocable to this state under
the Constitution of the United States, but that is
apportioned rather than allocated pursuant to the laws
of this state.
Art. IV.1(e) "Non‐businessapportionable income” means all income
other than businessapportionable income.
1. Reasons for Change
The Report states that “[a] majority of states have interpreted this
definition to provide two tests for identifying apportionable business
income: a transactional test and a functional test. The transactional test
refers to ‘income arising from transactions and activity in the regular
course of the taxpayer’s trade or business.’ It focuses on the frequency
and regularity of the transaction that produces the income. For
example, income from the sale of taxpayer’s products to its customers
would meet the transactional test. The functional test refers to ‘income
from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management
and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the
taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations.’ The functional test
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focuses on the property that is being disposed in the transaction that
produces the income. For example, income from the sale of machinery
or equipment that the taxpayer used to produce its product, or
otherwise used in its unitary business, would meet the functional test.
“However, the language of the Act is not very clear and some state
courts have held UDITPA provides only a transactional test. Under this
minority view, the words ‘and includes’ make the second clause (the
functional test) a qualifying clause that serves to exemplify a certain
type of income that is included only if it also fits within the first clause
(the transactional test). Under this interpretation, income from the sale
of machinery used in the taxpayer’s unitary business would only be
included in business income if that type of machinery is sold on a
regular basis. For example, a car rental agency that routinely sells and
replaces cars used in its rental fleet would treat income from such sales
as business income. In states where the courts found that the definition
contains only a transactional test, the legislatures generally followed‐up
with a statutory amendment to clearly add the functional test.
“There has also been a legislative trend over the last few years to
define business income simply as all income apportionable under the
U.S. Constitution. In part, this trend is a reaction to judicial decisions
holding that income arising from the liquidation of a business cannot be
included business income. In a nutshell, the theory behind these
decisions is that income can’t be ‘business income’ if there is no longer
any business. A policy concern with this theory is the potential
mismatch from allocating gain on the sale of a unitary asset after
apportioning expenses, such as depreciation, associated with that same
asset.
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“Although the definition of ‘business income’ is changing in many states
through judicial interpretation and legislative amendment, there
remains a high level of uniformity because states have moved largely in
the same direction–toward maintaining a broad interpretation of
business income. The question is whether the model provision should
be amended to clarify the existence of both a transactional and
functional test, and to include gain from the sale of unitary business
assets . . . Report, pp. 7‐8.
“The proposed language begins with a broad statement of intent to
include all income that is apportionable under the constitution . . . This
broad definition is intended to include gains from liquidation of a
unitary business, including a liquidation that is a deemed sale of assets
under I.R.C. 338(h)(10) and regardless of how the gains are used. To
address confusion over how ‘business income’ could include income
from selling the business itself, the draft would rename ‘business
income’ as ‘apportionable income.’ One option would be to end the
definition after this broad statement referencing the constitution. But,
constitutional boundaries can be amorphous. In order to provide more
statutory guidance, the transactional and functional tests are retained.
Under the proposal, business income includes, but is not limited to,
income that falls within one of these two tests.
“The proposal also clarifies the functional test in four ways. First, the
list of activities which describe how property can become integrated
into the business are expanded from ‘acquisition, management, and
disposition’ to include ‘employment’ and ‘development’ as well.
Presumably, ‘employment’ and ‘development’ are contained within the
meaning of ‘management,’ but they are now listed explicitly. Second,
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this list of activities is now connected with an ‘or’ rather than an ‘and’
to clarify that any one of these activities can integrate property into the
business.
....
“The third functional test clarification is to delete the word ‘regular.’ In
the current rule, both the transactional and functional tests use the
word ‘regular.’ This has led to questions of whether ‘regular’ limits the
functional test to frequent transactions . . .
“Because there is potential for confusion, and little to be gained, by
modifying ‘trade or business’ with the word ‘regular;’ the term is
deleted.
“The fourth functional test clarification is to require that the property
be ‘related to the operation,’ rather than constitute an ‘integral part,’
of the taxpayer’s trade or business. In the current rule, the term
‘integral’ is the touchstone for determining whether property has a
close enough relationship to the taxpayer to satisfy the functional test.
But the term is subject to multiple interpretations . . . The language of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Container and Allied Signal requires that the
property from which the income arises performed an ‘operational’
function, that it be ‘operationally related to’ or ‘related to the
operation of’ the taxpayer’s business, in order for the income to be
apportionable. This phrase–‘related to the operation’–was chosen
because it is more concrete than ‘integral part’ . . .” Report, pp. 8‐10.
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2. Public Comment
Mr. Bucks endorsed all proposed changes in Art. IV.1(a) and (e). Mr.
Miller endorsed replacement of the word “business” with
“apportionable,” in order to promote uniformity. However, comments
provided by Mr. Miller and Sutherland objected to the new
constitutional standard. Mr. Miller believed the standard would be
constantly changing; Sutherland stated the standard would be too
broad and would lead to inconsistent interpretation.
Mr. Miller approved of the change to Art. IV.1(a)(i), clarifying that there
are two separate tests for determining apportionable income. He
stated, “the proposed change makes it clear that income arising on the
disposition of property that is or was an asset of a unitary business
gives rise to apportionable income. The majority of the disputes in state
courts have arisen on the disposition of assets that were used in the
business and, in particular, when the assets were disposed of in
terminating a line of business or activities in a state. From my
perspective, there are several compelling justifications for treating the
results of these dispositions as apportionable income.”
Sutherland objected that the phrase “is or was,” in the proposed
language effectively terminates what is commonly referred to as the
“cessation of business” exception from business income. Mr. Faber
objected to the phrase “is or was” on grounds that it is not time‐
limited. Furthermore, he stated subparagraphs (A) and (B) were
unnecessary, and could be viewed as limiting the generality of the basic
proposition that all income that is constitutionally apportionable should
be apportioned.
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Mr. Miller supported the addition of Art. IV.1(a)(ii), noting that states
would encourage uniformity by choosing to apportion an item of
income which other states could only apportion.
3. Comments and Recommendations by the Hearing Officer
Much of the Hearing and written comments focused on the addition of
Draft Art. IV.1(a)(i): “all income that is apportionable under the
Constitution of the United States and is not allocated under the laws of
this state, including . . . ”
On the one hand, comments at the Hearing asked whether the above
language, the constitutional standard, might be viewed as rendering (A)
and (B) unnecessary, or even worse, that those paragraphs could be
viewed as limiting the basic proposition that all income that is
constitutionally apportionable should be apportioned.
On the other hand, some asked whether the redrafting of (A) and (B)
would make the constitutional standard unnecessary. The
constitutional standard was criticized as lacking any real guidance and
inviting unending litigation.
No one challenged the clarification in (A) and (B) that the definition of
business income (appropriately changed in the Draft to read
“apportionable income”) includes both the transactional and functional
tests. Nearly all states have reached that position, either through court
decisions or through changes in their statutes (often in response to a
court decision). Besides clarifying that there are two tests, the Draft
proposes some changes in the wording of these tests. None of the
comments specifically focused on these changes.
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i. Change in Name from Business Income to Apportionable
Income and from Non‐business Income to Non‐
Apportionable Income
The term “apportionable income” is more descriptive and informative
than the term “business income.” Similarly, “non‐apportionable
income” is more descriptive and informative than “non‐business
income.” The reason is that the goal of Art. IV.1 is to determine what
income is apportionable. The prior use of the term “business income”
failed to capture or convey that goal. Moreover, the term “non‐
business income” was misleading because the income being described
was indeed income of a business. By skipping the intermediate terms of
business or non‐business income and proceeding directly to the
ultimate goal of apportionable or non‐apportionable income, the Draft
should further sound analysis and reduce confusion.
ii. Modifying the Definition of Transactional Income in (A)
The Draft properly deletes the word “includes” between Draft Art.
IV.1(a)(i)(A) and Draft Art. IV.1(a)(i)(B). The “includes” led to confusion
about whether the functional test in (B) was an independent second
definition or an example of what was included within (A). The Draft
ends that confusion and makes it clear that two tests exist, a position
that is the consensus view among the states. Consistent with that
change, the word “and” at the end of (A) should be changed to “or.”
Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1986, Sec. 61.
Aside from the deletion of the word “includes,” Draft Art. IV.1(a)(i)(A)
tracks the language in Act Art. IV.1(a). It thus incorporates the phrase
“income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of
the taxpayer’s trade or business.” This definition is narrower than
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constitutionally required and is inconsistent with the broader
philosophical approach of apportioning income to the fullest extent of
the Constitution.
In addition, Draft Art. IV.1(a)(i)(B) deletes the word “regular” from the
Act’s functional definition, but retains it in (A). In the opinion of the
Hearing Officer, “regular” is not required for a constitutional definition
of the transactional test in (A), and its existence has led to adverse
litigation in some states. The retention of “regular” in the transactional
test in (A), combined with its deletion in the functional test in (B), is
certain to be the target of future litigation. The Hearing Officer
recommends that “regular” be deleted from (A).
Without the term “regular” in (A) some transactions might fall within
both (A) and (B). (Services would fall only within (A)). The Hearing
Officer is less concerned about this situation than about a transaction
falling within neither (A) nor (B).
One possible change for the Executive Committee to consider is
drafting (A) to read “income related to, or part of, the operation of a
taxpayer’s trade or business.” This change would free the definition
from the need to interpret the word “regular,” which has been
eliminated for good reason in (B). The word “operation” is used to
reference the language of Allied Signal, which some might argue is
unnecessary, but nonetheless seems a cautious change.
The Hearing Officer recognizes that there is some advantage in not
straying too far from the existing language in the Act. There is value to
auditors, taxpayers, and the courts in being able to rely on existing
precedent interpreting the current (A) (assuming it would be relevant
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to the redrafted (A)). Accordingly, tracking the language of current (A),
without incorporating its existing weaknesses, serves a useful purpose
even if some situations might now be covered by the redrafted (A) and
the redrafted (B).
In addition to the benefits of predictability and guidance, the more
similar the proposed language in (A) tracks the existing language in (A),
the less the need to resort to the constitutional standard. This would
appear to be an adequate answer to the argument that (A) and (B) are
not needed at all if apportionable income is defined solely as all income
apportionable under the Constitution. As a theoretical matter this
argument is correct; as a practical matter of drafting, however, there is
value in keeping (A) and (B), provided both sections are broadened as
suggested by the Uniformity Committee and in the Hearing Officer’s
proposed draft below.
iii. Modifying the Definition of Functional Income in (B)
The Draft expands the existing definition in (B) by adding “employment,
development,” Draft Art. IV.1(a)(B), a useful change that raised no
discussion at the Hearing or in the comments. The Draft also deletes
the word “and” in (B) and replaces it with “or,” clarifying that the series
of terms are in the disjunctive and not conjunctive. This clarification
eliminates a major source of prior controversy over the interpretation
of (B) and comports with the goals of the Draft.
The Draft deletes “regular” and “integral part,” and replaces these
references with “related to the operation.” Draft Art. IV.1(a)(i)(B).
These changes eliminate prior confusion, and make it clear that partial
or full liquidations of a business will constitute apportionable income,
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which is one of the goals of the Draft. In the opinion of the Hearing
Officer, these changes in (B) are constitutional and overdue.
The Draft includes property that was related to the operation of the
trade or business, with no time limit imposed. Draft Art. IV.1(a)(i)(B).
Consequently, property used in the past but no longer being used
would be included within (B). This raises the possibility that if property
had been used in the taxpayer’s business operations many years ago
but had been held purely as an investment since then, its sale would
produce apportionable income.
On this point, the Draft appears inconsistent with an MTC Regulation
providing that “property that has been converted to nonbusiness use
through the passage of a sufficiently lengthy period of time (generally,
five years is sufficient) or that has been removed as an operational
asset and is instead held by the taxpayer’s trade or business exclusively
for investment purposes has lost its character as a business asset . . .
Property that was an integral part of the trade or business is not
considered converted to investment purposes merely because it is
placed for sale.” MTC Reg. IV.1(a)(5)(A).
The reference in the Draft to property that was related to the operation
of the business might have been intended to resolve any doubt that a
partial or full liquidation of a business will constitute apportionable
income. But it also has another salutary effect. To the extent the
property when used in the business generated deductions that reduced
taxable income, such as depreciation, it would be appropriate to
recapture those deductions on the sale of the asset. This approach is
complicated because the deductions might have occurred in years
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when the apportionment formula was different (both quantitatively
and qualitatively) from that in the year of the sale.
This latter problem, of course, is not limited to assets that have
changed their characterization from operational assets to investment
assets, but applies more generally to assets that have always generated
deductions in the taxable periods prior to their sale. The problem of
apportioning the income from depreciable assets is discussed more
generally in Section III.E below.
In evaluating the Draft and the changes recommended by the Hearing
Officer, it should be noted that the Draft narrows the Act’s sales factor
to include only the receipts received from transactions and activity in
the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business. Accordingly, the
Draft introduces an interdependency between the transactional test
and the receipts factor. That change to the receipts factor is criticized
by the Hearing Officer. See Section III.E below. The receipts factor is
also affected by the Draft’s adoption of a throwout rule in the context
of market‐based sourcing. See Section III.D(8) below.
iv. Expanding the Definition to Include Income Apportionable
Under the Constitution of the United States
The most controversial of the proposed changes is the incorporation of
the constitutional standard. This change is not novel; at least six states
have similar provisions. Statutes dealing with other areas of the law
have also adopted a similar approach. The Hearing Officer asked
whether other states incorporating the constitutional standard have
encountered problems but no one has offered any examples.

48

Constitutional considerations are often part of the backdrop to the
existing definitions in (A) and (B) of the Act. For example, if a taxpayer
concludes that a transaction satisfies (A) or (B) of the Act, it must take
the next step and ask whether that characterization is constitutional.
Further, even if a taxpayer concludes that a transaction does not satisfy
a statutory definition, it should also consider whether that finding is
constitutionally mandated. In some cases, this type of inquiry may be
obvious or trivial; in other cases it will not. Explicitly adopting a
constitutional standard should not affect significantly the thought
process that already accompanies the application of current (A) and (B).
As the definitions in (A) and (B) are broadened as proposed by both the
Draft and the Hearing Officer in his proposed statute below, more
transactions will be covered by these sections. Anticipated litigation is
likely to focus on the terms in the definitions and, if covered, whether
that result would be constitutional. These arguments will probably be
the same whether or not the Draft explicitly incorporates a
constitutional standard.
The real impact of including the constitutional standard will be on
situations that do not neatly fall within the broadened redrafting of (A)
or (B), and these should be fewer in number than under the current
narrower language of the Act. In short, there should be fewer gray
areas under either the Draft or the Hearing Officer’s proposed draft
than under current law.
The broader definitions may cover nearly all common situations today
in a generally accepted constitutional manner, making it unnecessary to
refer to the new constitutional standard at all. But even if it is assumed
that (A) and (B) in the Draft cover all appropriate transactions today,
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rendering the constitutional standard unnecessary as some argue, no
one can predict the shape of tomorrow’s transactions. The future can
be expected to bring unanticipated situations that might fall into the
gray areas of redrafted (A) and (B). In that case, the constitutional
standard would be available to cover the unexpected and act as a
safety net.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer rejects suggestions that the reference
to the constitutional standard be deleted. In addition, because there is
value in terms of predictability, guidance, certainty and familiarity in
continuing (A) and (B) with the elimination of prior defects, the Hearing
Officer also rejects the suggestion that those paragraphs should be
replaced solely by reference to the constitutional standard. At the least,
those paragraphs offer guidance to auditors, who tend not to be
lawyers, and even if lawyers, may not be that familiar with
constitutional law. The same might be true of those who prepare
returns on behalf of taxpayers.
Furthermore, replacing (A) and (B) with a reference to only the
constitutional standard might make it harder for legislators to vote in
favor of the Draft. There may simply be too little guidance on what
legislators are being asked to vote on to garner enough support for
passage. Continuing the existing language (as modified) will make it
easier for legislators to feel comfortable in supporting the Draft.
Consequently, the Hearing Officer concludes that on balance the
reference to the constitutional standard is desirable and that the
broadened sections (A) and (B) should continue to be part of the
definition of apportionable income.
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v. Allocable Income that is Apportioned
Draft Art. IV.1(a)(ii) provides that apportionable income includes any
“income that would be allocable to this state under the Constitution of
the United States, but that is apportioned rather than allocated
pursuant to the laws of this state.” One Comment stated: “[t]his
proposed change recognizes that with respect to a particular item of
income that a state could [c]onstitutionally choose to allocate, assign it
to itself and tax accordingly, it may choose to forgo that choice and
include the item of income in apportionable income. By choosing to
apportion such an item of income which other states could only
apportion it promotes uniformity.”
An example of the above would be a state of commercial domicile that
does not allocate dividends to itself but instead chooses to apportion
them. Presumably, if the state of commercial domicile could
constitutionally allocate 100% of the dividends to itself it also has the
constitutional right to tax less than 100% and Mobil Oil v. Vermont
suggests as much. 445 U.S. 425, 444‐445 (1980).
Consequently, the apportionment of otherwise allocable dividends
would seem to be described by Draft Art. IV.1(a), “Apportionable
income” means: (i) all income that is apportionable under the
Constitution of the United States.” Accordingly, it is unclear what
purpose is served by Draft Art. IV.1(a)(ii). Furthermore, the reference to
income that a state could “constitutionally choose to allocate” provides
little certainty because the constitutional standards on what income is
allocable are undeveloped.
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Another difficulty is that “apportionable income” would not normally
be viewed as encompassing allocable income. In fact, if allocable
income is thought of as synonymous with nonbusiness income, it would
not normally be viewed as “apportionable income.”
The Hearing Officer believes that this situation of apportioning certain
categories of income, such as dividends, capital gains, or interest,
rather than allocating them, is uncommon and is best addressed by
state‐specific legislation rather than through the Draft.
vi. The Effect of the Draft on Shifting Income and Deductions
Among the States
Unaddressed by the comments or the Report is the shift in revenue that
might result from the Draft. Two effects will occur that have revenue
implications.
First, by broadening the definition of apportionable income, less
income will be treated as non‐apportionable income (known as non‐
business income under the Act). That will shift income away from states
to which it was previously allocated, often the states of commercial
domicile, to the states to which it will now be apportioned.
Second, like Section 265 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, states
deny deductions that are viewed as being associated with, or related
to, the generation of nontaxable income. A common situation at the
state level is interest expense that is viewed as attributable to the
generation of income not apportionable or allocable to the taxing
jurisdiction. For example, a non‐domiciliary corporation might borrow
money that it uses to produce allocable dividends or capital gains. The
non‐domiciliary states that apportioned the corporation’s business
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income should not allow a deduction for that interest because from
their perspective, the interest would be a cost of generating income
that they would not be taxing. The interest might be deductible in the
state to which the income was allocated. In the case of dividends,
capital gains, and interest the income would be allocated to the
taxpayer’s commercial domicile; if they exempt such income, as some
do, no deduction for interest should be allowed.
The Draft’s broadening of the categories of apportionable income
would not only shift formerly allocated income from the states of
allocation (where the income might not have been taxed) to the states
in which the income would now be apportioned, but also would now
shift deductions from offsetting allocable income to offsetting
apportionable income. As an a priori matter, it cannot be predicted
whether taxpayers will benefit or not from these changes or the
revenue effects on the states.
4. Proposed Draft by the Hearing Officer
The Hearing Officer proposes that the Executive Committee consider
the following redraft:
Art. IV.1(a) “Apportionable income” means:
(i) all income that is apportionable under the Constitution of
the United States and is not allocated under the laws of this
state, including but not limited to:
(A) income related to the operation of the taxpayer’s
trade or business; or
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(B) income from tangible intangible property if the
acquisition, management, employment, development,
or disposition of the property is, or was, related to, or
part of, the operation of the taxpayer’s trade or
business.
Art. IV.1(e) “Non‐apportionable income” means all income other
than apportionable income.
This proposed language eliminates terms in the existing Act that have
no constitutional significance, that have led improperly to adverse
results for the states, and that invite needless litigation and
controversy. The conjunctive “and” between (A) and (B) has been
replaced with the disjunctive “or” to eliminate any possible ambiguity.
The Hearing Officer’s draft makes it clear that the transactional test in
(A) and the functional test in (B) are independent of each other, and
illustrate two of the possible categories—albeit broad ones‐‐that
constitute apportionable income. Quite possibly, transactions might
simultaneously satisfy both definitions, but there is no reason these
two categories have to be mutually exclusive. Situations not falling
within either (A) or (B) will be tested against the constitutional
standard, although with the broadening of (A) and (B) these should not
be common. The proposed language in (A) and (B) is broad enough to
reach changes in the economy and in the new business practices that
will inevitably accommodate and facilitate those changes, but the
constitutional standard will be available to test the gray areas.
D. Market‐Based Sourcing
The Uniformity Committee provides the following new Section 17.
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Art. IV.17
(a) Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property
described in Section 16, are in this State if the
taxpayer’s market for the sales is in this state. The
taxpayer’s market for sales is in this state:
(a) the income‐producing activity is performed in this
State; or
(b) the income‐producing activity is performed both in
and outside this State and a greater proportion of the
income‐producing activity is performed in this State
than in any other State, based on costs of
performance.
(1) in the case of sale, rental, lease or license of real
property, if and to the extent the property is located
in this state;
(2) in the case of rental, lease or license of tangible
personal property, if and to the extent the property is
located in this state;
(3 ) in the case of sale of a service, if and to the extent
the service is delivered to a location in this state; and
(4) in the case of intangible property,
(i) that is rented, leased, or licensed, if and to the
extent the property is used in this state, provided
that intangible property utilized in marketing a
good or service to a consumer is “used in this
state” if that good or service is purchased by a
consumer who is in this state; and
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(ii) that is sold, if and to the extent the property is
used in this state, provided that:
(A) a contract right, government license, or similar
intangible property that authorizes the holder
to conduct a business activity in a specific
geographic area is “used in this state” if the
geographic area includes all or part of this state;
(B) receipts from intangible property sales that are
contingent on the productivity, use, or
disposition of the intangible property shall be
treated as receipts from the rental, lease or
licensing of such intangible property under
subsection (a)(4)(i); and
(C) all other receipts from a sale of intangible
property shall be excluded from the numerator
and denominator of the sales factor.
(b) If the state or states of assignment under subsection (a)
cannot be determined, the state or states of assignment
shall be reasonably approximated.
(c) If the taxpayer is not taxable in a state to which a sale is
assigned under subsection (a) or (b), or if the state of
assignment cannot be determined under subsection (a)
or reasonably approximated under subsection (b), such
sale shall be excluded from the denominator of the sales
factor.
(d) [The tax administrator may prescribe regulations as
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of
this section.]
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1. Reasons for Change
These proposed changes, the most sweeping of all the amendments,
generated most of the discussion at the Hearing. Typical complaints
were the Draft’s lack of detail and thus the lack of certainty and
predictability about how common transactions would be treated.
The Uniformity Committee’s approach in Draft Art. IV.17 stands in
sharp contrast with its approach in Draft Art. IV.1. There the Uniformity
Committee took a minimalist approach that tracked much of the
existing definitions in that section; here, by contrast, there was no
attempt to salvage anything of the Act’s costs of performance (COP)
approach in Act Art. IV.17.
The proposed market‐based sourcing in Draft Art. IV.17 is creative and
thoughtful and provides a constructive overall structure. The MTC
anticipates that key terms will be resolved by subsequent model
regulations. The substance of those regulations and the speed with
which they will be issued will be the key to the MTC’s success in
achieving uniformity.
The heart of the Draft is the general rule that sales not described in Act
Art. IV.16 (i.e., anything other than the sale of tangible personal
property) are assigned to a state if the taxpayer’s market for the sales is
in that state. That general rule is supplemented by a series of sub‐rules
that carve out special situations and define when a taxpayer’s market is
considered to be in a state. Act Art. IV.16 uses a destination principle
for assigning the receipts from the sale of tangible personal property.
Market‐based sourcing is intended to mirror that approach.
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The goal of harmonizing Act Art. IV.16 and Draft Art. IV.17 with respect
to the destination principle is laudable. No theoretical reason exists
why the receipts from the delivery of a DVD through the mail of a
movie should be assigned to a state differently from the on‐line
streaming of that same movie. Similar questions can be raised about
software, music, books, newspapers, magazines and the like that have
both tangible and electronic counterparts. As discussed below, the
difference between Act Art. IV.16’s destination principle and Act Art.
IV.17’s COP—destination v. origin—does not reflect any rigorous,
analytical thinking by the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1957. The
challenge is in implementing administrable rules that apply a
destination principle to the receipts from the sale of services and from
the sale and licensing of intangible property.
2. Public Comment
Mr. Miller was in favor of updating Art. IV.17 to reflect more accurately
the purpose of the sales factor. He particularly favored abandoning
UDITPA’s previous all‐or‐nothing assignment rule for sales of other than
tangible property. He also endorsed assignment of profits from
services on a market basis. Mr. Miller recommended the MTC establish
a hierarchy via regulations with respect to where delivery occurs.
Regarding sales of intangible property, Amy Pitter, from the
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, offered a comment expressing
support and stating the proposed MTC amendments resemble rules
that are currently used in Massachusetts. The Idaho State Tax
Commission stated the amendments would provide a sourcing method
that better reflects what Idaho believes to be the purpose of the
receipts factor. Mr. Faber contended the changes to Article
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VI.17(a)(4)(ii)(A) could result in multiple counting if the geographic area
of use included multiple states and each state took the position that
the property was being used within its borders. Mr. Miller felt in most
cases the specific sourcing rules are workable, although the sourcing of
some receipts, in particular those received from multistate entities,
may be difficult to determine precisely.
Sutherland stated it is unclear that market‐based sourcing presents
enough of an improvement over the current regime to warrant a
complete change of policy. It encouraged the MTC to explore the
possibility of preserving some form of costs‐of‐performance sourcing. It
also argued against inclusion of a throwout rule.
Mr. Bucks acknowledged objections to the amendments, but felt none
of those issues appear to justify rejecting a market‐based sourcing rule.
He encouraged adoption of the amendments.
3. Real Property
The sub‐rule for real property is clearly noncontroversial and was not
the subject of any Comment. The sub‐rule provides that “in the case of
sale, rental, lease or license of real property,” the taxpayer’s market for
the sales is in this state “if and to the extent the property is located in
this state.” Draft Art. IV.17(a)(1). The result is to assign the receipts on a
situs basis, which presumably would be the same result under Act Art.
IV.16’s destination principle (albeit a somewhat strained reading of
“destination”).
(The phrasing “if and to the extent that” is used throughout the Draft
Art. IV.17. The “if” is superfluous and in the interests of a cleaner draft
could be deleted. Two other places in the Act, Arts. IV.5(b), IV.8(a), use
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the “if” phrasing, but one Article does not. Art. IV.4. One Article
apparently hedges and uses the “if” phrasing in one subsection and
deletes it in two others. Compare Act Art. IV.8(a) with (b), (c).
4. Tangible Personal Property
The sub‐rule for tangible personal property is unexceptionable in
principle: “in the case of rental, lease or license of tangible personal
property,” the taxpayer’s market for the sales is in this state “if and to
the extent the property is located in this state.” Draft Art. IV.17(a)(2).
The rule does not apply to the sale of tangible personal property, which
is covered by the destination principle in Act Art. IV.16.
To say something is unexceptionable in principle does not mean that it
is straightforward in application. For example, a rental car company
probably does not know where—or the extent to which—its tangible
personal property is being used in any specific state. (Sometimes a
lessee is prohibited from leaving the state but that is the exception.)
That uncertainty is not a new problem because it can arise under the
Act today. See Act Art. IV.5(b).
What is new, however, is that the Draft adds an exculpatory provision
applicable to most of the sub‐rules in Draft Art. IV.17; nothing
comparable exists in the Act. If the market state cannot be determined
under the relevant sub‐rules, it shall be “reasonably approximated.”
Draft Art. IV.17(b). Presumably either the taxpayer or the tax
department can make a reasonable approximation. A reasonable
approximation for a rental car company might be to assume that a car
is used in the state in which it is rented. But given a small state where
tourists typically rent cars to tour a region of the country, such as New
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England, that assumption might not be as reasonable as it might be for
cars rented in Miami (or Hawaii).
If the market state cannot be reasonably approximated, the Draft
provides a throwout rule, Draft Art. IV.17(c), an approach a small
number of states already use as part of their market‐based sourcing
rules, and which implicitly underscores the problems posed by services
and intangible property. Under the throwout rule, the receipts are
excluded from the denominator of the sales factor (and implicitly from
the numerator). (Stylistically, the draft is inconsistent in that Draft Art.
IV.17(c) excludes the receipts from the denominator of the sales factor
but does not explicitly exclude them from the numerator; Draft Art.
IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C), by contrast, discussed below, explicitly excludes the
receipts from both the numerator and denominator of the sales factor.)
The result would be no receipts in the numerator and no receipts in the
denominator, which presumably is intended to be a zero sales factor (as
a mathematical matter, however, zero divided by zero is indeterminate
and not zero). No further residual rule is provided in case the factor is
zero. The throwout rule, of course, is inconsistent with a destination
principle (but so is the throwback rule for tangible personal property in
Act Art. IV.16(b)).
The throwout rule applies not only if the market state cannot be
determined or provided, but also if the taxpayer is not taxable in a state
to which a sale is assigned. Draft Art. IV.17(c). Act Art. IV.3 defines
when a taxpayer is taxable in another state and apparently by
inference, when a taxpayer is not taxable. See MTC Reg. IV.3(a).
Presumably that definition would continue to control the throwout rule
in Draft Art. IV.17.
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In a state having only a sales factor, a taxpayer’s inability to make a
reasonable approximation could result in no income being apportioned
at all, unless on audit the tax department were to invoke alternative
apportionment. But alternative apportionment cannot be invoked
unless an auditor can first determine problematic filing positions. To
make that more likely, a state should require that any receipts that are
ultimately thrown out must first appear on the return. The return
should be designed so that an auditor can easily determine the extent
to which receipts are being thrown out and the reason for doing so.
The rental of cars is used as a simple example to illustrate the general
structure of the Draft. Tangible personal property does not pose the
same degree of difficulty as do the rules for services and intangible
property discussed below.
5. Services
The destination principle in Act Art. IV.16 is hard to mimic in the case of
services. Tangible personal property has the advantage of involving
assets that in most cases can be seen and traced. In theory, their
destination is knowable. Services (and intangible property) present
different—and more difficult considerations.
The market for sales in the case of services is “if and to the extent the
service is delivered to a location in this state.” Draft Art. IV.17(a)(3). No
definition is provided for “delivered.” Presumably this key term and
others will be dealt with in the model regulations if the MTC adopts the
Draft.
The lack of a definition of “delivery” limits the extent to which the Draft
can be evaluated. “Delivery” will pose few problems if the customer is
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an individual who is a resident of the same state in which the service
provider is located. Similarly, if the customer is an intrastate
corporation in the same state in which the service provider is located
“delivery” should also pose few problems. In both cases, the strong
likelihood is that only one state–that of both the provider and the
customer–can be the place of delivery. The customer’s billing address
might serve as an acceptable proxy for “delivery.”
A multistate provider with out‐of‐state offices can complicate matters.
These offices might serve as the place of delivery (again depending on
how that concept is defined).
To illustrate the discussion above, suppose an architectural firm
performs its design services in State A, for a corporate client based in
State B, involving a project in State C. The firm sends drawings to the
corporate contact as an e‐mail attachment. Where does delivery take
place if the client downloads the attachment while on a plane, at home,
or at a hotel? What if the architectural firm makes the drawings
available at its web site, located on a server in State D, which is
accessed by the client while in State E? In which state did delivery take
place and how would the firm know?
What if the drawings are delivered in hard copy to the client’s office in
State B, or handed to the client when she visits the firm in State A?
Does it matter that the project is in State C? For a rule on delivery to be
workable it cannot require information unknown to the provider. A
sound rule must also not be easily manipulated.
A sound definition of “delivery” should not allow the firm’s receipts (its
fees) to be assigned to a state under tenuous, fortuitous, or
63

serendipitous circumstances, having little to do with any reasonable
policy considerations underlying how income should be apportioned.
Moreover, any rule for assigning sales should not be easily susceptible
to manipulation by the taxpayer.
If the scenarios above can result in assigning the service fee to different
states, the place of delivery could become elective. Digital services
could be delivered to low‐tax jurisdictions and retransmitted. To be
sure, this same possibility exists under the destination principle in Act
Art. IV.16, (especially with boats and planes) but in the case of services,
there are fewer transaction costs and constraints on the place of
delivery, which facilitates tax planning. It is tempting to use the
customer’s billing address as an acceptable proxy for “delivery,” at least
in the case of individuals who have less opportunity to change it in
cooperation with the service provider and the regulations should
address this possibility.
Some might argue that a customer has little incentive to cooperate with
a service provider in manipulating a malleable delivery rule in order to
save the seller some income tax. But if the amounts are large enough,
there may be an incentive to share the savings (taking into account the
risk of audit). The parties might also find it great sport (or enjoy the
absurdity) that a meaningless change in an economically irrelevant
consideration could have tax consequences. And what better message
for a tax adviser to send to a client than to show how income taxes can
be saved by altering the place of delivery?
If a service provider is not taxable in the state to which the sale is
assigned, or if a reasonable approximation of the market state cannot
be made (presumably by either the taxpayer or the tax administrator),
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the receipts from the service would be excluded from both the
numerator and the denominator of the sales factor, raising the
possibility of a zero sales factor. In a state that uses only a sales factor,
the provider might apportion no income anywhere; if there is an audit
and this situation is discovered, the tax department’s invocation of
alternative apportionment can be expected. Regulations under Draft
IV.17 or under the new power granted under Section 18, see Section
III.B above, should address this situation.
6. Intangible Property (Other than Marketing Intangibles)
The Draft provides two basic sub‐rules, depending on whether
intangible property is (1) rented, leased, or licensed; or (2) sold.
“Intangible property” is undefined.
The market for intangible property “that is rented, leased, or licensed,”
is in a state “if and to the extent the property is used in” that state.
Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(i). (The rule for “marketing intangibles,” discussed
below, assigns the receipt to the state of the consumer.) Like “delivery”
and “intangible property,” no definition is provided for the key term
“used” but definitions will no doubt be forthcoming in the model
regulations.
Because the Draft anticipates model regulations, it leaves many
questions regarding intangibles unanswered. To again take one of many
possible common situations, suppose a corporation providing
customized computer programming provides a site license for its
software to an interstate corporation. Where is the software used? The
vendor may not know about how the customer is legally organized or
structured. The vendor might have provided a site license to a holding
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company with numerous related entities. Persons accessing the
software may be employees of these entities. The vendor may be
unaware of which individuals will use the software within the
purchaser’s corporate enterprise, let alone where those persons are
physically located. This level of detail may be inaccessible to the
vendor.
To be sure, the Draft allows the vendor to make a reasonable
approximation, but there may be no basis for doing so. Presumably,
model regulations will address what constitutes a “reasonable
approximation.” Some states use proxies for place of use, such as the
billing address or the corporation’s commercial domicile. These provide
knowable answers, but may not reflect the actual use of the software
or the “market” in the case of business consumers; billing address may
be more acceptable for individuals. If the goal is to parallel the
destination principle of Act Art. IV.16, these proxies may fall short in
some cases. (In some states the customized software transaction
described above might be characterized as a service, which would be
covered under the “delivery to a location” rule, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(3), as
the license of tangible personal property, which would be covered by
the “located in this state” rule, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(2), or as the license of
intangible property, which would be covered by the “used in this state”
rule, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(i). Presumably the model regulations will
address these definitional issues.)
In defense of the Draft, one Comment submitted at the Hearing
suggested that it is common for a taxpayer to have the ability to audit
the use of an intangible to ensure the compensation is proper. In other
words, in the case of intangible property that is rented, leased, or
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licensed, a common method (but not exclusive) of compensation is for
the licensee to pay a royalty based on some measure of use; the
Comment suggests that an audit to determine whether the proper
royalty is being paid will also provide information on where the
intangible property is being used.
The Hearing Officer has examined the license agreements in cases in
which he has been involved. A few licenses provide for an audit, many
do not. In no agreement that the Hearing Officer examined does the
licensor have the right to determine where the licensed intangible is
being “used” (however that term might be defined) because that would
be irrelevant to determining the amount of royalty owed. Practitioners
have indicated to the Hearing Officer that the licenses they use do not
provide for the right to know where the licensed property is being used,
and they also emphasized the problem of defining the place of use.
From the perspective of the licensor, the relevant issue is whether the
licensee has paid the proper amount of royalties. Typically, that means
verifying the amount of sales made by the licensee that triggers the
payment of a royalty. That amount can be verified by examining the
federal tax return or the financial accounting records, without
determining where the intangible is used. Indeed, to determine “use,”
whoever was hired by the licensor to verify that the proper amount of
royalties had been paid (presumably a third party, such as an
accounting firm) would first have to determine a state’s definition of
“use,” and hope that the books of the licensee were kept in a manner
that comports with that definition, and that it had access to such
records.
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A licensee, however, might treat place of use as proprietary, and be
unwilling to provide that information or be unwilling to enter into a
license agreement requiring it to do so. Going forward, the licensor
could attempt to have the licensee provide whatever information is
required under the Draft, but licensees might refuse for reasons
ranging from the cost of doing so to issues of confidentiality. A licensee
might regard information on its manufacturing or production activities
as proprietary and be unwilling to provide details to the licensor.
Again, a range of transactions can exist, some that are likely to pose
administrative problems and others that will not. Presumably, the
regulations will provide workable approaches for the former. One
illustration of the latter involves franchisors, discussed below.
7. Marketing Intangibles
The Draft creates a new category of “intangible property utilized in
marketing a good or service to a consumer” (“marketing intangibles”)
which is a subset of “licensed intangibles.” Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(i). The
general rule that the market for licensed intangibles is where they are
used is further refined in the case of marketing intangibles. A sub‐rule
provides that “[i]ntangible property utilized in marketing a good or
service to a consumer is ‘used in this state’ if that good or service is
purchased by a consumer who is in this state.” Id. Report, p. 23, refers
to this as a “look‐through” rule, presumably because the licensor of the
marketing intangible, typically intellectual property, looks through the
license agreement to determine where the licensee sells a good or
service incorporating such property.
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The Report states the theory of the look‐through rule as follows:
“regardless of where the licensee is located, the taxpayer is able to
enter into that license agreement because there is a consumer demand
for its intangible in the state of the ultimate consumer. And in many
cases, the taxpayer will focus its marketing efforts in that consumer
state, not the state of the licensee.” Id. The first statement is an
accurate description of the economic reality of the transaction, but
does not mean that the look‐through rule can be easily administered.
The second statement might be true in some circumstances but not
necessarily in “many.” True, marketing efforts will occur in the
consumer state, but they may take place by the licensee and not by the
licensor. For example, if a famous athlete licenses her image for use on
a T shirt she might not engage in any marketing in the states where the
product is sold—her licensee may. She might not know the states
where her T shirt is being sold. The licensee will report that information
as part of assigning its income under Act Art. IV.16, but that would not
be available to the licensor.
One of the difficulties in evaluating the treatment of marketing
intangibles is the large number of diverse situations covered, some of
which might raise no problems but others that could. To take an easy
example, the Report cites a taxpayer entering into a franchise
agreement with a franchisee operating a restaurant utilizing the
franchisor’s trademark. Report, p. 23. Presumably, the franchisor will
have no trouble in applying the look‐through rule. Other franchise
situations should also pose no problem as the franchisor will typically
know where the franchisee is making its sales. Franchising is a large
part of the American economy so the look‐through rule should work
well in many situations.
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Large, sophisticated licensors that do their own marketing either
directly or through controlled entities should also present few
problems. Many licensors that generate large revenues from their
intellectual property can be expected to receive detailed geographical
breakdowns on sales and be very active in the marketing by their
licensees.
More difficult problems might accompany the licensing of intellectual
property for use on a T‐shirt, hat, towel, clothing, a box of cereal or
other consumer goods that occur through uncontrolled entities in the
business of performing these functions on behalf of third parties.
(Presumably, the licensing of technology, know‐how, formulas,
processes, designs, or patterns for use in manufacturing or production
would not be considered a marketing intangible but the Draft provides
no definition). In many of these cases, the licensors will not focus their
marketing efforts in the state of the consumer because they have no
expertise, experience, or the resources to do so. For example, a
university that licenses its name for use on clothing is unlikely to send
people across the state or the country in order to drum up demand.
The university may promote sales through its web site, which would not
occur in the consumer states. Third parties exist specifically to perform
marketing functions for licensors and to act as intermediaries with
licensees. The question is whether these latter types of situations will
present a significant administrative challenge and how much economic
activity they represent compared with situations that present no
problems.
The Hearing Officer notes that no look‐through rule is generally
required under Act Art. IV.16 for tangible personal property. For
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example, under the Act a vendor that sells its product to a distributor
assigns those sales based on the place of delivery rule. No explicit look‐
through rule attempts to determine where the distributor resells the
product. If the vendor has specific and verifiable information on where
the distributor ultimately sells to the end user, the sale could be
assigned to that state. (In the interests of disclosure, the Hearing
Officer is involved in a case raising this issue under Act Art. IV.16.)
Moreover, the throwback rule under Act Art. IV.16, and the throwout
rule under Draft Art. IV.17 are inconsistent with destination‐based
principles.
One type of look‐through rule, however, has been developed by the
courts under Act Art. IV.16 where a purchaser takes delivery in one
state for use in another. In that so‐called dock sale, a “look through”
rule is often used. But that is a much easier rule to administer than
when an intangible is involved.
A licensor that cannot determine where the marketing intangible is
used under the look through rule can make a reasonable approximation
of the market state. A state’s percentage of the nation’s population
might serve as a reasonable approximation. Some goods, however,
might serve regional markets, special political groups, particular sports
fans, unique age groups, certain religions, or ethnic groups.
Presumably, the regulations will address the elements of a “reasonable
approximation.”
Where a marketing intangible is licensed to a manufacturer, the look‐
through becomes problematic. The manufacturer is likely to sell to a
distributor, who will then sell to a retailer. The licensor might know
where the manufacturer produced a consumer good incorporating the
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licensed intangible property, but the purpose of the look‐through rule is
to determine the ultimate consumer. That information might not be
known to the manufacturer, let alone to the licensor.
Possibly survey data might exist that would allow the licensor to make a
reasonable approximation. If the market state cannot be determined or
approximated, however, the sales (royalties in many cases) will be
thrown out.
There is little in the Act to help resolve many of the problems identified
above. Act. Art. IV.8 covers the allocation of non‐business royalties
from copyrights and patents—presumably a narrow category. Act Art.
IV.8 provides that patent and copyright royalties are allocable to a state
to the extent that the patent or copyright is utilized by the payer in the
state. A copyright is utilized in a state to the extent that printing or
other publication originates in the state, Act. Art. IV.8(c). This rule has
little in common with the type of market approach that the Draft
intends to implement with respect to marketing intangibles, which is to
capture the state of the end user. Because Act Art. IV.8 deals only with
the narrow category of allocable non‐business income, little litigation
has resulted and the MTC has no regulations on the matter.
Whether copyrights are considered marketing intangibles under the
Draft is unclear. There may be little difference between the sale of a T
shirt with the licensed picture of a well‐known athlete—a marketing
intangible‐‐and the sale of that athlete’s autobiography, copyrighted by
that same athlete.
A patent is utilized in a state to the extent that it is employed in
production, fabrication, manufacturing, or other processing in the
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state, Act. Art. IV.8(b). Like the allocation rule for nonbusiness
copyrights, little litigation has resulted and the MTC has no regulation
on point.
The Act’s residual rule for non‐business copyrights and patents provides
that if the basis of receipts from such nonbusiness royalties does not
permit allocation to states or if the accounting procedures do not
reflect states of utilization, the royalties are allocated to the taxpayer’s
commercial domicile, not the customer’s. Act. IV.8(b), (c). This residual
rule, used by other states as part of their market‐based sourcing, does
not necessarily capture the “market” if that is viewed as use by the end
user. In addition, it shows that even in 1957 there was some concern
that the licensor might not know where the licensee was using the
copyrights or the patents.
8. Sale of Intangibles
The Report explains that in the case of a sale of an intangible, a
taxpayer is unlikely to know where the purchaser will use it,
presumably because the sales price will not be based on productivity.
Report, p. 23. The Hearing Officer has raised the possibility that a
licensor might not know the place of use in the case of a license
providing for royalties. Even if that possibility is overstated, however, a
taxpayer selling an intangible is unlikely to be entitled to information on
the place of use by the purchaser.
The Draft provides in Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii) that intangible property that is
sold (rather than licensed) is assigned to a state “if, and to the extent
the property is used” in that state subject to three sub‐rules.
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The first sub‐rule, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(A), covers the sale of an
intangible that relates to a specific geographical area. The geographical
area will be obvious from the nature of the intangible. The Report
illustrates this exception with the sale of “gate rights” at an airport.
Report, p. 23. The predictable result is that the receipts from the sale
will be assigned to the state in which the airport is located. Another
example would be an FCC license covering a specific geographical area.
The second sub‐rule, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(B), covers a sale made on
a contingent basis. Here the Draft implicitly assumes that the seller has
a continuing relationship with the purchaser and should be analogized
to a licensor and thereby subject to the rules described above that
cover the rental, lease, or license of intangible property. If those rules
do not work well in particular cases, as discussed above, they will not
work well in the case of a sale on a contingent basis.
The last of the three sub‐rules, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C), provides that
all other receipts (that is, receipts not described in the preceding two
sub‐rules) are thrown out. The throwout rule in Draft Art.
IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) is presumably meant to be exclusive of the throwout
rule in Draft Art. IV.17(c). In addition, if Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii) applies,
presumably the approximation rule in Draft Art. IV.17(b) is inapplicable.
This interpretation is implicit in the structure of the Draft but should be
made explicit by the regulations in order to avoid litigation.
The throwout rule in Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) would cover, inter alia,
the sale of stock, bonds, financial assets, contracts, leases, and the like.
(An MTC Regulation adopts a similar approach in the context of COP.
MTC Reg. IV.I8(c)(3) provides: “[w]here business income from
intangible property cannot readily be attributed to any particular
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income producing activity of the taxpayer, the income cannot be
assigned to the numerator of the sales factor for any state and shall be
excluded from the denominator of the sales factor.” The Regulation is
confusing because “business income” is not assigned to the numerator
of the sales factor—receipts are. Apparently the Regulation is referring
to receipts that are received from, or associated with, transactions or
activities generating apportionable business income.
The Report is clear on what the Draft intends, but the actual language is
confusing. Suppose, for example, a sole proprietor sells all the tangible
and intangible assets of a business for a fixed sum. The intangibles
might include goodwill, operating systems, patents, copyrights,
formulas, processes, designs, patterns, know‐how, customer‐based
intangibles, supplier‐based intangibles, trademarks, and trade names.
(While not all businesses will have this range of intangibles, almost all
will have goodwill.) Typically, the new owner can operate the business
wherever he or she wishes. Accordingly, this situation would fall
outside of the first sub‐rule, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(A), because of the
lack of a geographical connection. The sale was for a fixed sum so that
the second sub‐rule applicable to contingent sales would not apply. The
operative sub‐rule would be the third, which would throw out the
receipts.
But what if the seller knows where the buyer will “use” some of the
intangibles? Does the fact that the seller knows the “extent the
property is used” in a state trump the sub‐rules? The regulations should
clarify this situation.
The throwout rule in Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) will throw out from the
sales factor the receipts from three common transactions: the sale of
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stock in a corporation, the sale of a partnership interest, or the sale of a
membership interest in an LLC (other than a single member LLC or an
LLC electing to be treated as a corporation).
An asset sale of a business, however, would be treated differently. An
asset sale would include both tangible and intangible assets (at a
minimum goodwill). The receipts from the sale of any intangible assets
would be thrown out under Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C). The receipts
from the sale of tangible assets would be assigned under the
destination principle of Act Art. IV.16. (The sale of real property would
fall under Act Art. IV.17 but the result should be the same as if a
destination principle applied.)
If the Draft’s proposals on the receipts factor, see Section III.E, are
accepted, no difference would exist in how the sale of a business was
structured. The Draft proposes that Act Art. IV.1(g) be amended to
provide that the receipts factor include only gross receipts from
“transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade
or business . . .” Gross receipts from transactions or activities satisfying
the functional test would not be included. The latter would include
gross receipts from the sale of a business regardless of how that sale
would be structured. Draft Art. IV.1(g) has the advantage of treating an
asset sale of a business the same as a partnership, member interests, or
stock sales. The Hearing Officer, however, has concerns about the
Draft’s approach to Art. IV.1(g) and has proposed an alternative
approach. See Section III.E below.
Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) would throw out the receipts from the
treasury function (receipts from the maturity, redemption, sale,
exchange, loan or other disposition of cash or securities) and from
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hedging. In both of these cases, the underlying assets, whether stocks,
bonds, commercial paper, repos, contracts and the like constitute
intangibles. Consequently, the receipts from their sale (or from the
redemption of a bond, which is treated as a sale) would be thrown out.
Draft Art. IV.1(g) explicitly throws out from the sales factor the receipts
from the treasury function and from hedging. But because these
receipts are already thrown out under Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C), no
need exists to deal with these situations under Draft Art. IV.1(g) and
there are advantages in not doing so. See Section III.E below.
The treasury function typically involves intangible assets and not cash
per se. Cash, which is sometimes referred to as a financial asset, should
be classified as an intangible asset, just like a bond, CD, repos,
commercial paper or other financial assets, removing any doubt that
they are covered by Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C). MTC Reg. IV.10(a)
excludes coin and currency from the term tangible personal property
for purposes of the property factor. The model regulations under Draft
Art. IV.17, which will no doubt define “intangibles,” should make it clear
that cash is included in that definition.
The Hearing Officer understands that the Uniformity Committee did not
focus on the implications of Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) throwing out
receipts from the sale of stock, bonds, financial assets, partnership
interests, goodwill and so forth, and instead relied on Draft Art. IV.1(g)
to deal with these situations. The Uniformity Committee threw these
receipts out of the sales factor under Draft Art. IV.1(g) by excluding
receipts from transactions and activity satisfying the functional test.
Because many of the items the Uniformity Committee dealt with under
Draft Art. IV.1(g) are already thrown out under Draft Art.
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IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C), Draft Art. IV.1(g) does not have to sweep so broadly.
See Section III.E below. The Hearing Officer, for reasons discussed in
Section III.E below, is concerned about the Draft’s approach to Art.
IV.1(g). He thinks the preferred approach is to deal with the receipts
from the sale of intangibles, including by implication the treasury
function and hedging, under Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C), which is why
Draft Art. IV.17 is discussed in this report before Draft Art. IV.1(g).
The Draft provides no special treatment for the receipts from a license
for a fixed, lump‐sum royalty. A lump sum license has more in common
with a sale of an intangible than with a license for royalties and is thus
discussed in this section. Fixed, lump sum royalty licenses are
sometimes purposely used to avoid a state applying a Geoffrey rule. A
fixed, lump sum royalty makes it difficult for a Geoffrey‐state to
connect the use of an intangible in that state with a receipt because the
consideration is not contingent on use. Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(i), which
covers receipts from licenses, requires a connection between the
receipt and the use of the property in a state. The use of a fixed, lump‐
sum royalty license agreement makes determining that connection
difficult. If they are not treated as sales, lump sum licenses might be
dealt with under the rules calling for a “reasonable approximation.” The
possibility of a “reasonable approximation” in the case of a fixed sum
royalty should be addressed through regulations.
If fixed lump sum licenses are analogized to sales because the
consideration is not based on productivity, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C)
would appear to throw out the receipt from the sales factor.
9. Not Taxable In a State to which a Sale Is Assigned
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In addition to the special throwout rule for the sale of intangibles in Art.
IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C), a more general throwout rule is provided in Art.
IV.17(c) for other receipts (most notably, receipts from services and
licenses of intangibles) if, inter alia, the taxpayer is not taxable in the
market state.
Market‐based sourcing for services and intangibles raises special issues
of nexus. In the case of the solicitation of the sale of tangible personal
property, P.L. 86‐272 can prevent the market state from imposing an
income tax even if nexus would otherwise exist. But P.L. 86‐272 does
not apply to services or intangibles, the leasing of tangible personal
property (or to corporations incorporated in the taxing state). These
situations are outside the protection of P.L. 86‐272. Whether nexus
exists with the provider of a service or the licensor of intangible
property used in the state requires determining the extent to which the
holding in Quill applies to an income tax–an issue that is unresolved in
many states and one which the United States Supreme Court has not
yet chosen to resolve.
The look‐through rule raises its own set of nexus issues. What if the
taxpayer licenses its trademark to a manufacturer that affixes it to a
good that is ultimately sold in the taxing state? Is that enough to make
the taxpayer taxable in the market state?
In keeping with the general structure of UDITPA, which is silent on
issues of nexus, the Draft does not attempt to resolve these questions
or to formulate a nexus standard.
10. Throwout Rule
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The Act uses a throwback rule rather than a throwout rule in the case
of tangible personal property. Act. Art. IV.16(b) throws back sales of
tangible personal property to the office, store, warehouse, factory, or
other place of storage from which it was shipped. In the case of services
and intangible property, no compelling or logical “origination” state
exists to which the receipts should be thrown back. Accordingly, the
Draft opts for a throwout rule.
Although the throwout rule was infrequently used in the past, it came
to prominence in 2002 when New Jersey adopted that approach as part
of then‐Governor McGreevey’s tax reform. (In the interests of
disclosure, the Hearing Officer was a consultant to New Jersey.) The
traditional throwback rule was unacceptable to key N.J.‐based
businesses and the throwout was a reluctant compromise. The
throwout rule is the subject of ongoing litigation in New Jersey and has
been eliminated by the State.
The Draft’s throwout rule can lead to problematic situations. Consider,
for example, a service provider entirely based in State A whose
customers are all located in State B, where the provider is not taxable.
Assume that under the Draft, the service provider assigns all the
receipts from its services to State B. Under the throwout rule applied to
these facts the service provider would have a zero receipts factor
(assuming zero divided by zero is meant to be zero). If State A used only
a single‐sales factor, the service provider would pay no income tax. As a
policy matter, that result might be troubling, but raises no
constitutional issue and would be the same result even if no throwout
rule existed. If discovered on audit, a tax administrator might be
expected to invoke alternative apportionment.
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Suppose, however, that one customer moved from State B to State A
and the service provider assigned one percent of its sales to State A and
99% of its sales to State B. Assuming a single‐sales factor, the
movement of one customer would have the effect of State A taxing the
service provider on 100% of its income, a constitutionally suspect
result.
11. Approaching the Regulations by Industry or Type of
Transaction
The Draft anticipates that the MTC will flesh out the bones of Art. IV.17
through model regulations. The Hearing Officer believes that deferring
critical definitions and issues to state tax administrators without MTC
model regulations would be a strategic error. Upon adoption of the
Draft, the MTC should immediately begin a model regulation project.
The MTC has some of the most experienced and sophisticated talent in
the country. If any group should provide these critical regulations it
should be the MTC.
One thing seems clear (at least to the Hearing Officer): “one size will
certainly not fit all.” Key terms such as “delivery,” “use,” or “marketing
intangibles,” might be defined one way in the context of a specific
industry but in a slightly different way in other contexts. The Hearing
Officer fears that defining these and other critical terms in the abstract
will be less useful than doing so in a particular context, responding to
concrete and identifiable problems. In short, it might be more fruitful to
tackle definitional issues on a narrower, industry‐specific or
transaction‐specific basis. That is why criticism about the Draft being
long on principle but short on detail is misguided. The details should be
provided in the context of specific industries and transactions. The
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drafting would be greatly facilitated through a more narrow, industry,
or transaction‐oriented approach.
One overriding goal of the regulations should be to minimize the
implications of whether a transaction is characterized as a service, an
intangible, or a tangible. A perfect example is electricity. The
commercial use of electricity has existed for more than 100 years and
there is still no consensus on whether it constitutes tangible personal
property, covered Act Art. IV.16, intangible personal property, or a
service, both covered by Act Art. IV.17. Nothing should turn on that
characterization.
The
regulations
should
eliminate
these
characterization issues and that goal is more likely to be achieved if the
drafting is targeted and not done in the abstract.
12. Comments by the Hearing Officer on Draft Art. IV.17
The Uniformity Committee has offered the outline of a creative
approach to the assignment of receipts from services and intangible
property. (Alabama and Massachusetts have adopted statutes that
track the Draft.) The Draft substitutes market‐based sourcing for the
COP standard in Act Art. IV.17. The Draft enters the brave new world of
market‐based sourcing with broad principles and relegates key
definitions to model regulations. This drafting judgment call should
promote flexibility and the ability to deal with definitional issues on an
industry‐wide basis.
Without any guidance from the MTC, states have started to plough this
ground on their own. In the case of services, for example, some
approaches, whether set forth in statues, regulations, bulletins, or
announcements, assign receipts: to where the benefit is received; to
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where the service is delivered; to where the service is received; to
where the customer is located; if the receipts are attributable to a
state’s marketplace then to that state; if the service is provided to
individuals physically present in a state when the service is received
then to that state; if an office of the customer from which the services
were ordered is located in a state then to that state; if the service is
provided to a person engaged in a trade or business in a state and the
service relates to that business then to that state. At least one state has
separate rules for individuals.
Intangible property poses sourcing problems under a market‐based
approach because it has no meaningful geographical location. Just like
with services, states differ in how they source the receipts from the sale
of an intangible. Some rules assign the sale receipts: to the state where
the intangible was managed or controlled; to the location of the
purchaser; if the buyer uses the intangible in the regular course of
business at a location in the state then to that state.
States also use different approaches for assigning receipts from the
licensing of intangibles. Some rules assign the receipts from licensing
based on: where the intangible was used; on the proportion of use
within a state; where the purchaser used the property in its regular
course of business; proportionately to the states in which the product
or process protected by a patent is manufactured; in the case of a
copyright, to the states where the publication protected by the
copyright is produced or printed.
Some states have residual rules assigning receipts: to the commercial
domicile of the customer; the domicile of the business; the customer’s
headquarters; the customer’s principal place of business; the location
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of the office of the customer from which the services were ordered in
the regular course of the customer’s business; or the customer’s billing
address. These residual rules do not always capture the place of use by
the end user and may not be an improvement over COP.
The Hearing Officer has surveyed regulations, bulletins, notices,
pronouncements, advisory opinions and the like that try to put some
flesh on these approaches; in his opinion, they demonstrate the
difficulty inherent in market‐based sourcing of services and intangibles.
The field is still in a gestation period, with no consensus yet emerging.
The result is uncertainty, the lack of uniformity, inconsistencies,
administrative difficulties, and the possibility of manipulation by
taxpayers. Both over taxation and under taxation can be expected from
the poor interfacing of disparate and inconsistent approaches.
As a practical matter, this situation cries out for a uniform set of rules
under the leadership of the MTC. Without the imprimatur of the MTC,
it is understandable that states have adopted disparate approaches;
some inconsistent with each other, and many using residual rules that
may not capture the place of use by the end user.
The Report explains that the Draft rejects the approach used by some
states that assigns receipts based on where the benefit of the service is
received, and that in “most cases, the benefit will be received where
the service is delivered.” Report, p. 22. According to the Report, where
the service is delivered is a better rule because that is within the
knowledge of the provider. Id. An auditor may find it easier to
determine years after the fact where delivery by the taxpayer took
place rather than where a benefit was received by the customer. Id.
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A provider of services will oftentimes be unaware of where the
“benefit” (usually undefined in the statutes adopting this approach) will
materialize. For example, a provider may deal only with a corporation’s
purchasing agent. The provider might not know where the actual
benefits accrue and neither might the purchasing agent. Even if they
are able to make that determination, an auditor may be unable to
verify the taxpayer’s reporting position years later. The purchaser might
be unwilling (or unable) to cooperate with either the taxpayer or the
auditor. Finally, as corporations go bankrupt, merge, or change their
computer and operating systems, and as key persons retire, move, die,
or let go, the relevant information might not be easily available.
The dilemma is that delivery may possibly be more malleable than
benefits, but benefits are known only to the buyer. California has
recently adopted a “benefits” approach but it is too early to draw any
conclusions from its experience. A more robust discussion of the merits
of various rules is impeded by the Draft’s lack of any definitions of
operational terms.
In the case of services, the Report describes the use of “delivery” as
paralleling the destination principle in Act Art. IV.16, avoiding the need
for determining whether a transaction involves a service or tangible
property, which is increasingly difficult in the case of digital goods.
Report, p. 22.
Conforming Art. IV.16 and 17 is a worthwhile goal. But the delivery of a
service has little in common with the delivery of tangible property as
many of the examples above illustrated. Unless adequately defined in
model regulations, it may turn out that letting Act Art. IV.16’s
destination principle drive the treatment of services (and intangibles)
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will be misguided. Moreover, as long as the receipts from services and
licenses are subject to rules not found in Act Art. IV.16, such as
“reasonable approximation” and “throwout,” definitional issues will
remain as taxpayers will have an incentive to characterize a borderline
transaction in the most favorable manner. In addition, because receipts
from intangible property are generally assigned on the basis of use and
not delivery (assuming these are not coterminous concepts in practice),
there will still be the problem of whether a transaction involves a
service, intangible property, or tangible property.
Obviously, there are many situations that do not raise problems and for
which the Draft in its present form is adequate. These include services
by in‐state providers to in‐state individuals and to in‐state businesses.
But too many commonplace situations involving interstate businesses
have no predictable answers under the Draft (which may also be true of
other state statutes imposing market‐based sourcing). A sample of
situations suggested at the Hearing as having no straightforward,
predictable, or clear answers under the Draft include cloud computing;
the use of computer data bases like Lexis and Westlaw; applications
downloaded for use on a cell phone; services provided by a call center;
the remote repair of a computer; web design performed in one state
for a web site stored on a server located in another state, which is
accessed by persons around the world; advertising provided by Google;
and the installation of Microsoft software on laptops and PCs. These
situations await the model regulations.
Taxpayers fear that without a uniform approach by the states, multiple
taxation will be inevitable. The Hearing Officer fears the tax planning
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that will be facilitated by manipulable rules. Any weaknesses in the
rules are magnified in a state using only a single‐sales factor.
The relative newness of market‐based sourcing, the lack of a common
understanding of terms, let alone any consensus, the number and
diversity of situations impacted, make it incumbent on the MTC to
make model regulations its highest priority.
The model regulations face a formidable challenge, needing to define
critical terms like service, delivery, use, intangible property, sale, lease,
license, utilized in marketing, and reasonable approximation. Similar
definitional challenges mark the approaches used by other states so
that on administrative grounds it is hard to argue which of the
numerous extant approaches is superior. The “devil is in the details,” as
well as in the administrative compromises that might be made on audit.
A few of the above terms are used at various places in the Act today,
but are undefined, which has undercut uniformity. Surprisingly, there is
only one place where the MTC Regulations define “tangible personal
property.” In the context of the property factor, that Regulation
provides: “[t]he term ‘real and tangible personal property’ includes
land, buildings, machinery, stocks of goods, equipment, and other real
and tangible personal property but does not include coin or currency.”
MTC Reg. IV.10(a). Intangible property is undefined but is excluded by
inference from the property factor, Act, Art. IV.10.
In defining key terms, the MTC should examine the Streamlined Sales
Tax Project (SSTP), and state sales tax statutes. A term defined for
purposes of one tax regime like the sales tax, does not necessarily have
be defined the same when used in a different tax regime, like the
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income tax. The Second Circuit made this point over fifty years ago
when it warned about avoiding the trap of interpreting the term “gift”
the same whenever it is used in the Internal Revenue Code. The court
explained that the same transaction might be called a "gift" in the gift
tax law, a "gaft" in the income tax law, and a "geft" in the estate tax
law. Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (1942). Just
because the term “gift” is used in these various contexts does not mean
it has to be defined the same. Words take their meaning from context.
But the sales tax is (or should be) concerned with the concept of
consumption and where it occurs—an inquiry that is relevant to
market‐based sourcing. The SSTP has also dealt with many problems
that are inherent in the Draft, including how to characterize a bundled
transaction. That characterization issue must be confronted in
determining whether a transaction is covered by Art. IV.16 or Art. IV.17.
In any event, definitions that other groups have struggled with,
whether it be the SSTP, or attempts (not all successful) to tax services
under a sales tax by Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Maryland, or
other consumption taxes like the VAT, suggest approaches that might
be a source of wisdom and inspiration.
The Hearing Officer has identified problems that the Uniformity
Committee should consider addressing. Trying to evaluate the degree
to which the problems are serious or overstated is difficult because key
definitions await the regulations. Some might point to the lack of
litigation in states that have already adopted market‐based sourcing
similar to the Draft as evidence that the Hearing Officer has
exaggerated the defects. But practitioners have assured the Hearing
Officer that it is still too early to expect any litigation to have occurred.
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13. Revisiting Costs of Performance
The Report criticizes the COP rules in Act Art. IV.17. One set of
criticisms is directed at defects in the rule; the other is directed more
broadly at the rule being origin based whereas Act Art. IV.16 is market
based.
The Report correctly notes that in 1957 “origin” and “market” may have
been coterminous for many services but that is no longer as true today.
Report, p. 19. Because of the limited role of interstate services that
marked the 1950’s (and the Act’s exclusion of financial organizations
and public utilities), COP might not have received the same attention
during the drafting of UDITPA as that given to Act Art. IV.16. That is
understandable because of the dominant role played by mercantile and
manufacturing activities at the time the Act was being formulated, and
the smaller role of interstate services (especially given the exclusion of
financial organizations and utilities). In addition, the COP rules tend to
overlap with the property and payroll factors, a criticism more relevant
when the Act was adopted and the prevailing apportionment method
was the evenly‐weighted, three‐factor formula.
The Hearing Officer (who in the interest of disclosure has participated
in litigating COP cases) believes that the perceived weaknesses of that
method can be addressed. Whether it is too late in the day to do so,
especially in states that have already adopted a single‐factor sales
apportionment (or clearly moving in that direction) is another matter.
The discussion below might be more relevant for states that still use
COP and for states that may (or have) become disillusioned with
market‐based sourcing and may wish to revisit COP.
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i. Replacing the All or Nothing Feature of COP with a
Proportionate Approach
One common criticism of COP is that it assigns all of the receipts from a
service or from the sale or licensing of an intangible to the state that
has a plurality of the costs of performing a taxpayer’s income‐producing
activities. Consequently, a corporation that incurs 3% of such costs in
32 states and 4% in the 33rd state will assign all of the receipts to the
33rd state. The Hearing Officer has never seen anything approaching
this rather uniform distribution of costs but theoretically it could occur.
Instead of an “all or nothing” method, a proportionate approach could
be used. In the example above, each of the 32 states would be assigned
3% of the receipts and the 33rd state would be assigned 4% of the
receipts. A few states use this proportionate approach.
A disadvantage of the proportionate approach is that it requires a
taxpayer to calculate its COP on a yearly basis. By contrast, the
advantage of the “all or nothing” approach is that a taxpayer that
clearly has the overwhelming plurality of its direct costs in one state
year‐after‐year is free of an annual calculation. Unless there are drastic
changes in the conduct of the business, that taxpayer can rely on
having done the COP calculation once and avoid the expense of redoing
it annually. A proportionate approach will increase the number of
controversies.
Another perceived disadvantage is that even a proportionate approach
might not assign receipts to the market state if the taxpayer’s efforts
there are insignificant (but nonetheless satisfy the nexus requirement).
A proportionate approach might do nothing to eliminate the
differences between the shipment of tangible personal property
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assigned to a state under Art. IV.16 and the downloaded electronic
counterpart of that property. But that is the logical implication of an
origin‐based factor.
ii. Definition of Direct Costs
Act Art. IV.17 does not limit the costs of performance to “direct” costs
but an MTC Regulation imposes this condition. MTC Reg. IV.17
provides: “[t]he term ‘costs of performance’ means direct costs
determined in a manner consistent with generally accepted accounting
principles and in accordance with accepted conditions or practices in
the trade or business of the taxpayer.” Many states incorporate the
“direct costs” rule in their COP rules without further definition. The
Hearing Officer has found that generally accepted accounting principles
and accepted conditions or practices in the trade or business are often
of little help in defining direct costs.
The Hearing Officer’s experience is that there are selected categories of
costs, such as depreciation, research and development, sales and
marketing, technical support, and billing, which cause most of the
problems in a COP calculation. These tend to be the focus of
controversy and litigation. The question is whether rules can be
developed for these categories that cannot be manipulated and can be
easily implemented by taxpayers without extensive and costly analysis
and be appropriately audited by the states.
iii. Treatment of Independent Contractors
Act Art. IV.17 does not refer to independent contractors but MTC Reg.
IV.17(4)(C) does, and states have been influenced by it. The basic issue
is whether payments to an independent contractor can constitute
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direct costs. If so, a taxpayer has to know where the independent
contractor performs its services so that the cost can be assigned to a
specific state for purposes of the COP calculation. The MTC has done
much work on this issue, as the regulation above suggests.
The dilemma is that unless independent contractors are included in the
measure of direct costs, definitional issues may arise about how to
characterize a particular service provider. In extreme cases, an
employer might be tempted to terminate employees and hire them
back as independent contractors. Experience under the Internal
Revenue Code in classifying service providers is not encouraging so
there is value in extending COP to cover independent contractors. Yet
in many situations, the taxpayer may have no idea where the
independent contractor performs its services. In that case, the MTC
Regulation provides a default rule that uses the customer’s domicile,
and if that cannot be determined, payments to independent
contractors are ignored.

iv. Defining Income‐Producing Activity
One of the great sources of controversy under COP is how to define an
income‐producing activity. Act Art. IV.17 is silent on this and an old
MTC Regulation is not very helpful. See MTC Reg. IV.17(4)(B).
Instead of this knotty definitional problem, the entire apportionable
business income of a unitary business could be viewed as the income‐
producing activity, which would greatly simplify the COP calculation.
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After all, a business is not a charity; it engages in activities to produce a
profit. All of its activities are intended to produce income—otherwise
why spend the money? Assuming the dictates of Allied Signal are
satisfied, all of the apportionable business income can be viewed as the
“income producing activity.”
Formulary apportionment is premised on the theory that in a unitary
business it is impossible to segregate on a state‐by‐state basis income‐
producing activities. That segregation is what separate accounting
required, and has been long rejected in most cases. The theory of a
unitary business is that it is meaningless to try to match a particular
activity with a specific item of income, which is one of the reasons why
formulary apportionment has generally replaced separate accounting.
One goal of the apportionment formula is to determine the income
produced by activities occurring in the taxing state. The income
produced by activities in a state are what the formula attempts to
measure; consequently, such activities should not be used to determine
the receipts that enter into a state’s formula intended to measure the
income produced by those activities.

v. No Need for a Throwback or Throwout Rule
Art. IV.17 does not contain a throwback (or throwout) rule. Because it is
an origin‐based approach, nexus is virtually assured with the state in
which the taxpayer has a plurality of its costs of performance. The same
conclusion would hold even under a proportionate approach.
Consequently, no need exists for a throwout or throwback rule if COP is
retained. The idiosyncrasies of the throwout rule are avoided.
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vi. Interaction with the Single‐Sales Factor
The Hearing Officer believes that COP’s warts and weaknesses are
known; whether they can be cured is a technical question. The political
problem is that COP is an origin‐based approach, the antithesis of
market‐based sourcing, the destination principle in Section 16, and the
direction the states seem to be moving towards. In theory, COP can be
used in conjunction with a single‐factor sales formula, but as a practical
matter, a state adopting that formula will likely reject an origin‐based
assignment of sales in favor of market‐based sourcing. States adopting
single‐sales apportionment typically adopt market‐based sourcing, and
eliminate any throwback rule. (There is at least one state, however,
with a single‐factor sales formula that nonetheless uses a throwback
rule.)
COP is incompatible with the economic development considerations
that led to single‐factor apportionment. As the Report notes, “[COP’s]
duplication of the property and payroll factors is particularly counter‐
productive for states that have tried to more heavily weight the sales
factor as a means of encouraging economic development.” Report, p.
19. States adopting a single‐factor sales formula would be unexpected
to adopt COP (or revert back to even a double‐weighted, three‐factor
formula). Even if a new and improved COP could be made workable, its
era may have passed.
14. Concluding Comments
As an a priori matter, the Hearing Officer cannot predict whether
refining the COP method will be less productive or useful than refining
market‐based sourcing. Both COP and market‐based sourcing require
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further guidance. The question is whether the COP problem areas
identified above are manageable and if not, can they be excluded from
the calculation in their entirety without nullifying the methodology. The
Hearing Officer has total confidence in the intellectual prowess of the
MTC and those taxpayers willing to work with it in good faith to refine
COP.
Some might worry that pursuing COP would somehow undercut the
special industry rules developed by the MTC, which have successfully
applied a mixture of COP and market‐based sourcing approaches to
specific industries. The Hearing Officer was not asked to address those
special industry rules. He believes, however, that they are a source of
guidance and insight about the problems raised by market‐based
sourcing. In general, there is great value in dealing with industry‐
specific problems rather than drafting in the abstract. In any event, the
Hearing Officer is not recommending that any of these special industry
rules should be revisited. The Hearing Officer assumes that these
industry‐specific regulations can co‐exist with COP or with the Draft’s
market‐based sourcing.
The MTC’s earlier work on Act Art. IV.17 stopped in order to let the ULC
project proceed. It was widely understood that the ULC was going to
make Art. IV.17 a high priority. While it was entirely appropriate for the
MTC to have suspended its efforts and not run a parallel project to the
ULC, the lost time was unfortunate. With a large minority of the states
having adopted some form of market‐based sourcing with diverse rules,
a pressing need for uniformity exists. Once the ULC abandoned its
project, the MTC became the logical body to bring some order and
uniformity to the field and encourage coordination by the states.
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The Executive Committee has a threshold decision: should it try to
refine the Act’s COP or should it adopt the Draft’s Art. IV.17 and
proceed with model regulations. The Hearing Officer presumes that the
Executive Committee will endorse the Draft, and proceed with drafting
of model regulations. Speed is of the essence if the MTC is to exert
influence in this area. It can only be hoped that the states that have
already marched down the path of market‐based sourcing will reverse
their current practices if those turn out to be inconsistent with MTC
model regulations.
E. The Receipts Factor
The Uniformity Committee recommends that:
Article IV.1(g) SalesReceipts” means all gross receipts of the
taxpayer that are not allocated under Sections 4 through 8 of this
Act paragraphs of this article, and that are received from
transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s
trade or business; except that receipts of a taxpayer other than a
securities dealer from hedging transactions and from the
maturity, redemption, sale, exchange, loan or other disposition of
cash or securities, shall be excluded.
1. Reasons for Change
This proposal elevates the heart of a 1973 MTC Regulation into the
body of the proposed statute. MTC Reg. IV.15(a) provides that “for the
purposes of the sales factor of the apportionment formula for each
trade or business of the taxpayer, the term ‘sales’ means all gross
receipts derived by the taxpayer from transactions and activity in the
regular course of the trade or business.” Accordingly, the regulation
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excludes from the sales factor gross receipts related to transactions
satisfying the functional test, such as the sale of a machine, equipment,
plant, or a business.
Closely related to this regulation is MTC Reg. IV.18(c), which provides
that “substantial amounts of gross receipts from an incidental or
occasional sale of a fixed asset used in the regular course of the
taxpayer’s trade or business” are excluded from the sales factor. This
regulation would seem to be unnecessary under MTC Reg. IV.15(a).
More recent MTC Regulations exclude from the sales factor the so‐
called treasury function activities. MTC Regs. IV.2(a); IV.18(c)(4). All of
these regulations seem inconsistent with Act Art. IV.1(g), which
provides that “‘[s]ales’ means all gross receipts of the taxpayer not
allocated under paragraphs of this Article,” and are best understood as
sweeping propositions under alternative apportionment.
The Draft thus rejects the view that if an item of income is included in
the preapportionment tax base, the related receipts should be included
in the sales factor. The throwout rule proposed by Draft Art. IV.17 also
rejects this view (as does any throwout rule).
The Report’s strongest argument for including the gross receipts from
only the transactional definition is that it is “generally agreed that the
purpose of the sales factor is to reflect the taxpayer’s market activity,
not its production activity. If that is the case, then the type of receipts
that are included in the sales factor should be those that reflect the
contribution of the taxpayer’s market to the earning of income. It is
unnecessary, and may be counter‐productive, to include receipts from
transactions involving the taxpayer’s production property—such as
plant, machinery, and equipment—in the sales factor. Including
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receipts from these types of assets would not reflect the market for the
taxpayer’s product and could essentially double count the property
factor.
“In a three‐factor apportionment formula, the sales factor is intended
to balance the property and payroll factors, and it should be defined to
offset rather than amplify the contributions of the production states. If
the Executive Committee were to adopt a single sales factor, then this
analysis may be different. In that case, it may be reasonable to provide
for some reflection of the contributions of production states, even if
that is accomplished through the sales factor.” Report, p. 16.
2. Public Comment
Mr. Miller characterized the existing definition of receipts as “overly
broad,” which has led to efforts to inflate the denominator, resulting in
“nowhere” income. He would prefer to define sales more narrowly. He
also challenged the view that receipts from business income have to in
the sales factor.
Sutherland objected to the exclusion of receipts from hedging
transactions, stating that hedging activity directly relates to some
taxpayers’ ability to establish and maintain a marketplace, and
excluding them does not reflect the taxpayer’s sales.
3. Comments and Recommendations by the Hearing Officer
The United States Supreme Court has never endorsed the Report’s view
of the sales factor. The Report’s view is also inconsistent with the Act,
which defines sales as including all gross receipts that are not allocated.
(The defect in this definition is addressed below.) The MTC Regulations
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cited above would be unnecessary if the Act had adopted the Report’s
narrow view of the sales factor.
By including only receipts received from transactions under the
transactional test but excluding all other receipts, the Draft might place
more weight on that category than its definition may be able to bear. A
taxpayer wishing to include (or exclude) the receipts from a transaction
would have an incentive to characterize an activity as falling within (or
without) the transactional test, creating the potential for litigation that
the Draft’s broadened definition of business income was appropriately
supposed to reduce.
A taxpayer seeking to include receipts in the sales factor would want to
avoid the functional test and would have an incentive to characterize a
transaction as a service rather than as property. Services are outside
the functional test but could satisfy the transactional test. Conversely, a
taxpayer seeking to exclude the receipts would have an incentive to
characterize a transaction as property rather than a service and then
argue the functional test rather than the transactional test was
satisfied. Especially in a digital world, the line between property and
services can be blurry (as well as the line between tangible and
intangible property). The goal should be to reduce pressure on these
categories but the Draft does the opposite.
The Draft’s incorporation of the Act’s definition of the transactional test
with its reliance on the concept of “regular” is inconsistent with the
Hearing Officer’s proposed draft of apportionable income. See Section
III.C above. The Draft would resurrect the very problem that the
Hearing Officer was trying to avoid in his draft—litigation over the word
“regular.” The Hearing Officer fears that the definition of “regular,”
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with all of its ambiguities, will become the focus of future litigation if
the Draft’s definition of receipts is adopted.
These comments expose the interplay between the definition of
apportionable income and the definition of receipts in the sales factor.
That interplay is minimized in the Act because the sales factor includes
all receipts from business income. The Draft, however, includes in the
sales factor only a subset of receipts generated by apportionable
(business) income.
Another significant interplay is between the throwout rule under the
Draft’s proposed market‐based sourcing and the receipts factor. Draft
Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) throws out certain receipts from the sale of
intangibles. For example, receipts from the sale of stocks and bonds
and other intangible financial assets would be excluded from the
receipts factor under Draft Art. IV.17. See Section III.D(8) above.
Receipts from hedging and from the treasury function (discussed
below) are generated by the sale of intangibles. Accordingly, the
adoption of Draft Art. IV.17 would eliminate the need to address these
receipts in Draft Art. IV.1(g).
Whether the sales factor should be viewed as the Report suggests,
rather than partly as a political compromise as described in Section III.A
above, the apportionment formula must yield to the constitutional
mandate that it be fair, reflect a reasonable sense of how income is
generated, and be rationally related to values connected with the
taxing state. That principle trumps a particular view of the sales factor.
To be sure, the constitutional mandate should not be woodenly
followed any more than the proposition that the receipts factor should
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be limited to transactions satisfying the transactional definition should
be slavishly followed. But the Hearing Officer believes there should be
strong and compelling reasons for excluding from the sales factor the
receipts related to income that is included in the preapportionment tax
base. And the Hearing Officer views the sales factor as more in the
nature of a political compromise than the result of any grand economic
theory or model.
Excluding receipts from the sales factor has the result of apportioning
the gain (or loss) generating those receipts using the status quo ante
apportionment formula. The Hearing Officer recognizes that situations
exist for which excluding the receipts would be acceptable but others in
which it would not. Much depends on the apportionment formula (e.g.,
three factor or one factor), the nature of the income generating the
receipts at issue (e.g., the sale of a depreciable or amortizable asset),
and the ability to assign the receipts in an acceptable manner to the
numerator of a particular state’s sales factor. The difficulty of saying
anything very useful in the abstract is that transactions come in so
many sizes and shapes.
Consider, for example, a corporation that at the beginning of January
sold a trivial amount of inventory and shortly thereafter sold the plant
in State A that manufactured that inventory and ceased operations.
Assume the gain on the sale reflected increases in the value of the real
property in State A, and that the inventory was delivered outside of
State A. If State A used a single‐sales factor, and the receipts from the
sale of the plant were excluded as the Draft proposes, none of the gain
would be apportioned to State A, which has a strong claim to tax such
gain. If all the destination states also used a single sales factor and
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excluded the receipts from the sale of the plant, the gain would be
apportioned based entirely on the receipts from the inventory. In this
case, a very tiny tail would wag a very large dog, perhaps violating the
external consistency doctrine or triggering Section 18 relief.
One could describe the above problem as being caused not by the
exclusion of the receipts but rather by the adoption of a single sales
factor. As a matter of logic, the problem is caused by both the exclusion
of gross receipts and the adoption of the single sales factor. But one
teaching of Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) is that the
Supreme Court is not likely to mandate particular types of
apportionment formulas; accordingly, in litigation the formula will
probably be accepted as the starting point. The framework of analysis is
likely to be on whether as applied the formula is fair and reflects a
reasonable sense of how income is generated if the gross receipts from
the sale of the plant are excluded from the sales factor.
Obviously, the illustration above has been purposely skewed to mark
one polar point on the continuum of possible situations, whose results
under the Draft could vary dramatically. Excluding the receipts from the
sale of goodwill by a manufacturer ceasing operations, for example,
might be acceptable under a three‐factor formula. (Draft Art.
IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) would, however, throw out these receipts from the
sales factor.)
Depreciable personal property raises a further complication because it
involves assets whose gain on the sale might recapture in whole or in
part the previously deducted depreciation. Under the Draft (and Act)
there is a disconnect between the states bearing the cost of the
depreciation deductions associated with the asset and the states that
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tax the gain that recaptures that depreciation. (Loss assets are
discussed separately below.)
In other words, the apportionment of taxable income can be viewed as
the apportionment of gross income less the apportionment of
expenses, one of which would be depreciation. Depreciable business
property would have generated deductions, which would have reduced
taxable income and thus income taxes in the states to which the
taxable income was apportioned. Depreciation reduces the basis of an
asset and gain on the sale recaptures in whole or in part those
deductions.
To illustrate, consider an asset that cost $1000 and that was
depreciated over a number of years to $100. If the asset were sold for
$1000, it will generate a tax gain of $900. That gain represents a
recapture of the entire $900 of depreciation previously taken. Cf. Int.
Rev. Code of 1986, Section 1245. The Draft (and the Act) would tax the
$900 of tax gain using the taxpayer’s apportionment formula in the
year of sale. The Act includes the $1,000 receipts in the sales factor; the
Draft would not.
An alternative approach, perhaps more defensible (albeit not very
administrable) would be to apportion the gain to the states that bore
the cost of the recaptured depreciation. For example, assume the
corporation was taxable in two states: A and B. Assume State A’s
apportionment percentage remains constant at 10% and State B’s
apportionment percentage remains constant at 90%. Assume further
that State A’s tax rate remains constant at 5% and State B’s tax rate
remains constant at 10%. Using the asset described above, if $900 of
depreciation were claimed over the life of the asset, $90 would have
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been apportioned to State A, reducing taxes because of that deduction
by $4.50. The corporation would have apportioned $810 of
depreciation to State B, reducing taxes because of that deduction by
$81.
Of the $900 gain on the sale of the asset, $90 would be apportioned to
State A, increasing tax by $4.50, which offsets the cost of the
depreciation previously apportioned to State A. Of the $900 gain on the
sale of the asset, $810 would be apportioned to State B, increasing tax
by $81, which offsets the cost of the depreciation previously
apportioned to State B. The correct result is reached by excluding the
gross receipts from the sale.
That result, however, would be achieved under a very specific—and
unrealistic—set of conditions. The apportionment percentage would
have to be the same in each of the states in which the corporation was
taxable over the life of the asset, the tax rate would have to remain the
same, and the corporation would have to be taxable in exactly the
same states.
Obviously, apportionment percentages change, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Tax rates change. The states in which the corporation is
taxable will change, not only because business operations might
expand or contract, but also because of changes in the interpretation of
nexus. In addition, the economic life of an asset is likely to be longer
than the period over which depreciation is claimed, virtually ensuring
that none of these conditions will be satisfied. It would be sheer
serendipity if apportioning the gain in the year of sale without including
the gross receipts would reach the correct answer.
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The receipts factor alone cannot begin to deal with these
considerations, nor can the property factor. One approach to this
problem would be to segregate the sold asset for schedular treatment.
Consider the $900 tax gain in the asset above. Under a scheduler
approach, if the asset had been depreciated over five years, the
amount of each year’s depreciation that is recaptured could be
multiplied by each state’s apportionment percentage in each of those
years, then multiplied by the appropriate tax rate in each year, and the
results aggregated (putting aside credits and NOLs and the like). The
aggregate amount would be that state’s share of the tax on the gain.
A further complication is that if the asset were sold for more than
$1000, only $900 would represent a tax gain. The excess of the sales
price over $1000 would be an economic gain. The economic gain might
reflect changes in market conditions independent of actions by the
taxpayer, making the normative treatment of the gain harder to
determine.
If expenses were deducted that helped create the tax gain, such as
drilling expenses that led to the discovery of oil, making the property
worth many times its purchase price, then the same arguments for
recapturing depreciation could apply to “recapture” those expenses.
Losses become trickier. A loss on the sale of an asset can be viewed as
functionally equivalent to the amount of depreciation that should have
been allowed in an ideal world with perfect information. Put
differently, if the rules on depreciation reflected the actual decline in
the value of an asset, there would generally be no loss on the sale of an
asset because its adjusted basis would equal its fair market value.
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To conform the treatment of loss assets with the above approach for
gain assets, a taxpayer would apportion the loss in the year of sale
based on an imputed annual amount of additional depreciation. That
amount would be multiplied by each state’s apportionment factor in
each of the years in which the asset was depreciated. That amount of
apportioned imputed depreciation would then be multiplied by the
appropriate state tax rate in each of the years the asset was
depreciated, and the results then aggregated (again putting aside
credits and NOLs and the like). The result would be each state’s share
of the loss.
The reader should rest assured that the Hearing Officer is not seriously
suggesting that the above approach be implemented; only showing
how apportioning the gain (or loss) in the year of sale to the states in
which the taxpayer is doing business in that year, which may be quite
different from the states in which the asset was depreciated, using an
apportionment percentage quite different from the percentages that
applied in the years of depreciation, and tax rates that might have
changed over time, does not begin to recapture the cost of previously
claimed depreciation, regardless of whether the gross receipts on the
sale are included or excluded from the sales factor.
So what to do? Intertemporal differences are typically ignored by most
states (installment sales being the exception). Either including the gross
receipts generated by income satisfying the functional test as the Act
does, or excluding such receipts as the Draft does, can raise external
consistency and Section 18 issues, and it is not clear that there is a
systemic bias one way or the other. The Hearing Officer has seen
situations that triggered Section 18 issues where the gross receipts
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were included and ones where they were excluded. Generalizations are
simply not very useful given the wide range of transactions that can
occur.
Excluding the gross receipts from transactions satisfying the functional
test, however, has one advantage not set forth in the Report. If a
business is sold as a stock sale, the sale of a partnership or membership
interest, Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) would throw out the receipts. If a
business is sold as an asset sale, the receipts from tangible assets would
be assigned under Art. IV.16 using the destination principle. By
excluding such receipts from the sales factor, the Draft would conform
stock sales, partnership sales, and membership interests in an LLC with
asset sales.
i. Exclusion of Receipts from Hedging Transactions and from
the Maturity, Redemption, Sale, Exchange, Loan or other
Disposition of Cash or Securities
The Report defends its exclusion of receipts from hedging and from the
so‐called treasury function (which is a shorthand for the maturity,
redemption, sale, exchange, loan or other disposition of cash or
securities) as follows: “[b]asing the definition of ‘sales’ on the purpose
of the sales factor has implications for whether to include receipts from
the treasury function and other financial activities where there is no
‘customer’ (e.g., receipt of dividends or interest income). If the purpose
of the sales factor is to reflect the taxpayer’s market for its product,
then, unless the taxpayer is a securities dealer, receipts from its
treasury function and other financial activities should be excluded.
These exclusions are consistent with the MTC’s current model
regulations. Some states exclude these receipts entirely. Some limit
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inclusion to net rather than gross receipts. If the problem were only
distortion, then a limitation to net may be fine. But if there is also a
policy problem of inconsistency with the purpose of the sales factor, or
a practical problem of how to source these treasury function receipts,
then exclusion may be the better approach. The Committee chose
exclusion.” Report, p. 16.
In the interests of disclosure, the Hearing Officer has participated in
cases involving both the treasury function and hedging on the issue of
whether the gross receipts involved were sales within the definition of
Act Art. IV.1(g). In all of these cases, the persons in charge of these
transactions were unaware of state tax considerations and operated
under strict guidelines that constrained their discretion to buy and sell.
And one crucial difference between the two situations is that certain
taxpayers might not be in business without the ability to hedge their
purchases of critical raw materials. For these taxpayers, hedging is part
of an inventory control function, which goes to the heart of generating
business income. Nonetheless, the Hearing Officer is aware of the
theoretical and pragmatic arguments against including the receipts in
the sales factor from both the treasury function and from hedging.
The Hearing Officer will not debate the merits of excluding the receipts
from the hedging or the treasury function. In his opinion, the Draft
needlessly creates a bad precedent of excluding a class of transactions
from the sales factor. It is not difficult imagining that the tables might
be turned on a state with a taxpayer (or industry) lobbying for the
exclusion of a class of receipts that will be in its favor, citing for support
the precedent of the state having previously excluded the receipts from
hedging and the treasury function. The club today can become a snake
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that bites tomorrow. Because Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) already throws
out the receipts from hedging and the treasury function, see Section
III.D(8) above, Draft Art. IV.1(g) need not address these transactions.
The Hearing Officer prefers a statute that sends the message that
exclusion of gross receipts is the exception and should be limited to
exceptional circumstances. The specific exclusion for hedging and the
treasury function sends the wrong message. To be sure, the throwout
rule in Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) could be viewed as sending that same
message, but it is more muted. As a political matter, the Hearing Officer
believes that the throwout rule for the sale of intangibles in Draft Art.
IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) is less likely to be successfully seized upon by lobbyists
seeking similar treatment for their clients than if the sales factor
explicitly excluded hedging and the treasury function.
Some might argue that the treasury function and hedging are so
significant that they merit a “belts and suspenders” approach, being
both thrown out under Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) as well as in Draft
Art. IV.1(g). But this “belts and suspenders” approach invites a court to
reconcile the two provisions, which may result in the more specific—
Draft Art. IV.1(g)—superseding the more general—Draft Art.
IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C).
If a court were to do so, a policy issue would then arise regarding the
exception for securities dealers. The exception’s rationale is clear: for
dealers the so‐called treasury function represents transactions and
activities that would be described under the transactional test. But so
might the income of market makers and others that might not be
described as a “securities dealer.” Indeed MTC Reg.
IV.18(c)(4)(E)(Ex.(ii)) excludes traders as well as dealers from the
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treasury function, but the Draft excludes only the latter. A similar
question can be raised about those involved in hedging that might be
the counterpart of a “securities dealer.” The risk of singling out
securities dealers as an exception from the treasury function is that
other persons exist that perform equivalent activities. This drafting
problem is avoided under the throwout rule of Draft Art.
IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C).
Dealers will still have to assign the receipts from their treasury function
activities to the numerator of a state’s sales factor. That assignment will
presumably take place under the rules of Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C),
which will throw out the receipts. Accordingly, the carve out would
seem to have no effect on where the receipts would be assigned under
the Draft but will lend some support to a dealer’s Section 18 claim for
equitable apportionment.
For the reasons above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the preferred
course is to deal with hedging and the treasury function only under
Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) and encourages the MTC to deal with the
issue through a regulation and also address whether others, like
traders, should also be covered.
On an administrative note, the Hearing Officer recommends that any
time an exclusion from a factor is provided as the Draft does for
receipts generated by business income satisfying the functional test, or
as the Draft does with its throwout rule under Art. IV.17, the tax return
should be designed so that the items at issue are identified. If a return
is filed with the exclusion or throwout already being taken so that the
item never appears in the first instance, an auditor is handicapped in
determining whether the statute has been followed.
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Finally, the Hearing Officer fully endorses the Draft’s change in the
name from “sale” to “receipts.” Receipts better captures the range of
items that can be included, such as dividends, interest, capital gains,
rents, royalties, and services.
4. Proposed Draft by the Hearing Officer
The Hearing Officer presents two alternative drafts. Each assumes that
Draft Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) has been adopted by the Uniformity
Committee and that receipts from the treasury function and from
hedging do not have to be addressed by Draft Art. IV.1(g).
The alternatives clean up a problem with the Draft. The Draft retains
the language of the Act referring to the “gross receipts of the taxpayer
not allocated . . . ” The problem is that receipts are not allocated, gain
or loss is. The two alternatives below eliminate that reference.
i. Alternative One
“’Receipts’ means gross receipts of the taxpayer that are received from,
or associated with, transactions or activities generating apportionable
business income defined in Art. IV.1.”
Alternative One is broader than the Draft and broader than Alternative
Two. It implements the principle that if income is apportionable, the
concomitant receipts should be included in the sales factor so that the
apportionment formula is more likely to be fair and reflect a reasonable
sense of how income is generated and prevail on a constitutional
challenge.
The Hearing Officer prefers his proposed draft of business income in
Art. IV.1(a) to that proposed by the Uniformity Committee, see Section
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III.E, but the reference in Alternative One to Art. IV.1 will incorporate
whatever the MTC decides.
Alternative One would cover receipts from transactions or activities
that might not satisfy either the transactional or functional tests but
would nonetheless satisfy the constitutional test. The Hearing Officer
considers this an advantage but presumably the Uniformity Committee
would not.
Compared with the Alternative Two, Alternative One will reach more
situations that raise potential claims of alternative apportionment.
Some might welcome that; others will not.
Less fundamentally, Alternative One replaces the conjunctive “and”
with the disjunctive “or” and changes “activity” to “activities.” A
disadvantage of Alternative One is that it does not treat asset sales of
businesses the same as stock, partnership, or LLC sales.
ii. Alternative Two
“’Receipts’ means gross receipts of the taxpayer that are received from,
or associated with, transactions or activities generating apportionable
business income defined in Art. IV.1, excluding substantial amounts of
such gross receipts from an incidental or occasional sale of a fixed asset
or other property that was, or is, related to, or part of, the operation of
the taxpayer’s trade or business.”
This alternative adopts the hoary MTC Reg. IV.18(c) cited above, which
excludes a subset of transactions satisfying the functional test.
Alternative Two excludes some situations that might otherwise raise
issues of alternative apportionment under Alternative One.
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Alternative Two would presumably exclude the receipts from the
typical sale of a business, thereby having the effect of equating the
treatment of stock, partnership, or LLC sales whose receipts are
excluded from the sales factor under Art. IV.17(a)(4)(ii)(C) with asset
sales of a business. The terms “substantial,” “incidental,” and
“occasional,” have apparently not spawned significant litigation. These
terms can be dealt with through regulations. The absence of litigation
can be ambiguous of course, and does not necessarily mean things are
working well; sometimes it merely means that problems are not being
discovered on audit or that the rule or regulation favors taxpayers.
Nonetheless, the Hearing Officer prefers Alternative Two to the Draft.
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